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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
FLIGHT ANOMALY RESOLUTION 
B y  J o h n  D. Lobb 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The frequency of the Apollo missions demanded that flight anomalies be quickly 
identified and resolved so that prompt corrective action could be taken. Analyses of the 
data for problems and anomalies had to be compressed into a relatively short time 
frame. 
Timely resolution of flight anomalies was achieved during the Apollo Program 
so  that corrective actions necessary for crew safety, mission success, and program 
success were completed during each mission and between missions. This success was  
largely due to a team of engineers who understood the details of hardware design, test  
history, and operational characteristics of their respective systems. A working rela- 
tionship that ensured quick responses and concurrence of this team with program 
management and flight operations personnel contributed equally to program success. 
The analysis team had access to the support of any other specialists o r  facilities needed 
to the extent justified by the nature of the particular problem. Team understanding of 
the mechanism associated with the cause of the problem was  required for resolving 
each anomaly. Complete understanding of an anomaly often required postflight data 
analysis, crew debriefings, and testing of spacecraft hardware. 
The efficient documentation system established a definite point on which to focus 
direction and continuity of effort for more effective anomaly resolution. The flexibility 
of some of the documentation provided continuous updating by the analysts and ensured 
a common understanding of the current status of each system problem by the analysis 
team and by program management and flight control personnel. 
Of course, the complexity of the spacecraft configuration and of the complement 
of experiments taken on the lunar-landing missions increased the probability of a wide 
variety of anomalies. The same general procedure was used to properly identify and 
understand each problem, analyze the cause, and determine the proper course of action. 
Examples of actual flight anomalies illustrate the general types of causes identified, 
the levels of analysis required, and differences in the nature and extent of the correc-  
tive actions justified. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
Flight anomaly resolution was the mission evaluation task that covered space- 
craft and experiment problems and deviations from expected or  predicted performance. 
This task included not only the resolution of true failures and malfunctions, but also the 
resolution of items that appeared to be problems o r  discrepancies at first but that, on 
further investigation, proved to be incorrectly identified as anomalies. Thus, the term 
"resolution, '' as used in this report, includes the proper identification of the anomaly 
as well  a s  the determination of the cause and the proper course of action to be taken 
both during the mission in progress at the time and before subsequent missions. 
The flight anomaly resolution system used during the Apollo Program was an out- 
growth and further development of the mission evaluation procedures used on the pre-  
vious manned space flights of Project Mercury and the Gemini Program. Mission 
evaluation ensured that maximum information was obtained from each Apollo flight for  
use in managing and planning later flights and future programs. 
also provided to the scientific community and to the public so that they could be well  
informed on the activities of U. S. space exploration. 
The information was  
It was necessary that anomaly resolution be completed in a timely manner for 
the interim in-flight course of action. Jus t  as important was the need for a time frame 
that would enable completing the proper corrective action for subsequent missions with- 
out requiring changes in the scheduled launch dates for lunar -landing missions, which 
were limited to specific lift-off t imes and calendar dates for each lunar exploration site. 
This report contains a discussion of the primary characteristics of the success- 
ful resolution of Apollo flight anomalies. Typical experiences have been used to 
illustrate how the system was  actually implemented. In addition to the examples of 
flight anomalies discussed in the body of the report, extracts from actual anomaly 
resolution reports for four problems a r e  presented in the appendix. These extracts 
have been included to illustrate that changes from issue to issue of the reporting system 
reflect the progress made in resolving anomalies. The four anomalies selected reflect 
different combinations of causes, sources of data for analysis, corrective actions, and 
reporting his tor ies  . 
PERSONNEL 
Essential to the successful performance of anomaly resolution was  the makeup 
and interaction of the mission evaluation team. Each of the many disciplines involved 
was represented on the team by a group of specialists managed by a NASA team leader 
who was  also a specialist in the same discipline. Each specialist had a thorough under- 
standing of system characteristics, operations, and limitations gained from experience 
with his particular systems from initial design through development and testing of the 
hardware. Team members were selected from NASA and contractor personnel. 
Each team leader was the analysis manager for  anomaly resolution'within his 
particular range of responsibility. For example, the Apollo 14 team included an 
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analysis manager for each of the following: telecommunications, crew systems, elec - 
tronic systems, propulsion and power, guidance and control, structures and mechanics, 
thermal control, flight crew support, trajectory, and lunar surface experiments. 
The responsibilities of each team leader included coordination with the other team 
leaders to ensure that any solution o r  recommended course of action would not jeopard- 
ize  other systems. The team leaders reported to an evaluation team manager who 
was responsible for the overall operation of the team, reviewed and integrated the inputs 
f rom the team leaders, and communicated with the Mission Control Center as the single 
point of contact. In addition, an anomaly engineer was responsible to the team manager 
for  following through on each anomaly to completion of the resolution. There was an 
anomaly engineer for command and service module problems, one for lunar module 
problems, and one for experiments and Government-furnished-equipment problems. 
Continuity to completion of the activity was enhanced because some team members in 
each discipline were also responsible for the detailed implementation of hardware 
changes required for subsequent missions. The mission evaluation team provided 
direct support to the flight control organization in the Mission Control Center for in- 
flight resolutions and to program management for resolutions requiring action on the 
ground before subsequent missions. 
, 
The premission planning and training of flight operations personnel with the crew- 
men covered many possible failures and malfunctions of systems and components. 
These failure modes and corrective contingency procedures were thoroughly exercised 
during simulations. Nevertheless, it was not surprising that unpredicted problems and 
discrepancies were encountered with a complex configuration such as the spacecraft 
and the complement of experiments taken to the Moon. 
evaluation team were to properly identify and understand these problems, to perform 
the investigations and analyses required, to determine the causes, and to recommend 
the proper courses of action. 
The prime tasks for the mission 
In support of the team effort at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
(formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)), the prime contractors maintained 
similar teams of specialists at  'their facilities during the mission for analyses, tests,  
and related activities as they were required. These teams also reported to the mission 
evaluation team management at  MSC. 
Many times during Apollo flights, the support team personnel at the prime con- 
tractor facility provided test  information that w a s  invaluable for understanding a prob - 
lem and for determining the best  course of action. For example, during lift-off of the 
Apollo 12 spacecraft, a lightning discharge resulted in tumbling of the inertial platform 
and loss  of inertial reference. The support team at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, performed a test  simulating the condition in 
an attempt to understand how the potential discharge had caused the platform to tumble. 
It was important to quickly verify that the platform had not been damaged. A prompt 
response w a s  received by the evaluation team, and the mechanism that had caused the 
conditions in flight w a s  determined. 
The choice of team personnel for  Apollo flight anomaly resolution was  a major 
contribution to the success of the missions, Many of the analysis managers continued 
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in that capacity for  the entire program and, thus, provided continuity to the anomaly 
resolution and corrective action effort as well as exceptionally good intrateam under - 
standing. The team manager, who was also chief of the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Pro- 
gram Office Test Division, led the mission evaluation and anomaly resolution operation 
for the Apollo Program, beginning with the Apollo 6 flight. 
I DENTI F I  CAT1 ON OF ANOMALIES 
The first task of the mission evaluation team was to identify the anomaly. This 
task required the team's constant awareness of the total system performance as the 
mission progressed. Individuals monitored telemetry data that were received by the 
tracking stations, transmitted to and processed by the Mission Control Center, and 
displayed on closed-circuit television receivers in the Mission Evaluation Room. In 
addition, the air -ground voice communications and television coverage of crew activi- 
t ies were closely monitored. Selected telemetry data, which were not on the television 
displays, were provided to team members in the form of computer tabulated printout 
copies several hours after transmission for analysis of system performance. Identifi- 
cation of flight anomalies continued after completion of the mission through crew 
debriefings and additional individual conferences between specialists and the crewmen, 
results of the analyses of in-flight photography, and results of the analyses of reduced 
data from the mission. 
Identification of anomalies for the lunar surface equipment operating at the five 
Apollo science stations will continue for the remaining data -gathering lifetime of each 
installation. When indications of a problem appear in the telemetry data, various 
troubleshooting command sequences a r e  transmitted to the affected station to help 
identify the possible anomaly. Initial indications sometimes are evident in the real- 
time data; at other times, the anomaly may not be evident until the more detailed data 
processed by the principal investigator have been analyzed several  months later. 
I nsu f f i c i en t  Ground  Test Data 
System performance was usually determined by comparing the flight data with 
performance predictions and with data from ground tests and from other flights. Data 
comparison was also a prime method of detecting anomalies. However, in the most 
difficult identification problems, the available data were not sufficient for  complete 
understanding of all normal operating characteristics of the system. 
A typical example of this condition occurred on the Apollo 7 mission. The com- 
mand module entry battery recharging characterist ics were below predicted levels 
throughout the flight, and the planned charge levels could not be maintained. Available 
ground test data were insufficient to explain the condition. 
ted during postflight tests, and a detailed analysis was made. Results of the analysis 
showed that the charger to battery line impedances, which were not evaluated previously, 
were large enough to cause a significant reduction in the charge voltage applied at the 
battery. Results of the system analysis also showed that the charger output voltage was  
within specifications, but on the low side, and that the characterist ics of an experimen- 
tal plate-divider material used in the batteries could result  in a condition, at zero g, 
that could limit the recharge capacity of the battery, 
The condition was duplica- 
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As a result  of the anomaly investigation, chargers with the highest voltage out- 
put were selected for subsequent missions, and integrated systems tes ts  were per-  
formed to establish the overall system characteristics of each installation and, thereby, 
to ensure adequate recharge capability. In addition, for Apollo 11 and subsequent 
missions, the charger was modified for  a higher output voltage setting, and conven- 
tional plate -divider material was used in the batteries. Performance on subsequent 
missions was satisfactory. Additional detail on this anomaly is contained in 
reference 1. 
I nsufficient Flight Data 
Sometimes, the flight data were insufficient for immediate identification of a 
specific problem. 
system thrust light, located on the entry monitor system panel, was illuminated 
shortly after transposition and docking at a time when no engine-firing command w a s  
present. Because the problem could not be accurately identified by using available data, 
the crewmen were provided with special troubleshooting procedures to better pinpoint 
the problem. Application of the fault isolation procedures resulted in isolation of the 
malfunction to a short  circuit in bank A of the service propulsion system ignition c i r -  
cuitry. The results of the next special procedure - to manually initiate ignition for 
the first midcourse correction thrust firing by closing the pilot-valve main A circuit 
breaker - further verified that the short  circuit existed on the negative side of the 
service propulsion system pilot-valve solenoids, and also indicated that subsequent 
maneuvers could be controlled by manual control of bank A. Results of postflight 
tests and examination of the returned hardware showed that the intermittent short  
circuit was caused by a freefloating strand of contaminating w i r e  inside the system A 
differential-velocity thrust switch. All switches of this type were subjected to addi- 
tional screening procedures for subsequent missions. 
For example, during the Apollo 15 mission, the service propulsion 
Obvious Component Failure 
Many anomalies were recognized simply because a specific component was 
obviously not functioning. For example, during the initial deployment of the Apollo 12  
color television camera on the lunar surface, the picture was lost because the camera 
was inadvertently pointed at the Sun. The direct sunlight had caused a light overstress,  
which damaged the image sensor to the extent that a usable picture could no longer be 
attained. For further details, see  the appendix and reference 2. 
Crew Observation 
Sometimes, the initial indication of an anomaly resulted from observation of an 
off-nominal condition by a team member o r  by a crewman, reported either at the time 
the problem occurred o r  later if the problem was  not critical. An example was the 
postflight report  by the crewmen concerning the failure of the primary floodlights in 
the command module lower equipment bay during the Apollo 7 mission. Subsequent 
investigation revealed that the lamps had been operated excessively in the dimmed 
mode before flight. For additional information, see the appendix. 
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ANALY S I S 
Two basic techniques were used to determine the cause of a problem and the 
required corrective action. The first technique was the experimental testing of the 
actual or identical hardware under actual or simulated flight conditions or under labo- 
ratory ambient conditions. The use of breadboard systems when required was another 
type of experimental testing available to the mission evaluation team. The second 
technique was  analytical, generally in the classical sense. 
included the use of computerized mathematical models, the application of physical laws, 
and the use of established engineering formulas. 
The analytical technique 
The choice of technique depended on the nature of the problem. The most expe- 
dient approach was sought; however, attention to detail was a lso of prime importance 
because the analysis had to be sufficiently rigorous to establish the cause and, then, 
to develop and prove the necessary corrective action to prevent future occurrences. 
Of course, corrective action sometimes was  unnecessary. 
Extensive Analysis 
The extent of the analysis varied considerably and depended on the significance 
and nature of the problem. Extensive analysis sometimes was required, 
on the Apollo 6 mission, a structural failure occurred in the adapter that housed the 
lunar module during launch and provided the structural connection between the service 
module and the launch vehicle. 
designed and developed for any application to that time. Photographs from mission 
support aircraft and ground-based long-range cameras showed that much of the honey- 
comb sandwich facesheet had separated abruptly from one of the four circumferential 
sections of the adapter during launch. The effects of the separation were indicated on 
many measurements in the command and service module, the lunar module, and the 
launch vehicle. The adapter continued to sustain the required loads, however. 
For example, 
This adapter had the largest honeycomb structure 
The seriousness of the problem because of its possible effect on the integrity of 
the space vehicle and impact on the Apollo Program required an extensive analysis. 
The investigation of this anomaly included testing full-scale hardware under dynamic 
and static conditions, performing many experimental , tests on smaller test  art icles,  
and performing extensive structural analyses at various NASA centers and contractor 
facilities. To determine the cause of this anomaly, analyses were made of the struc- 
tural  dynamics of the launch vehicle, the dynamic loads of the lunar module, the 
dynamic modes of the adapter itself, the effect of thermal and pressure environments 
during launch, and the assembly techniques and quality control procedures used in the 
manufacture of the adapter structure. 
The investigation was  focused first on an  understanding of the coupled vibration 
modes and vibration characteristics of the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and the 
adapter. Results of extensive vibration tests showed that the failures had not been 
caused by vibration. Investigations of the thermal and pressure conditions, which 
included full-scale simulations, revealed that the pressure buildup within the honeycomb 
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sandwich, because of the effect of aerodynamic heating on air and moisture trapped in 
the panel, could have caused the anomaly wherever a weak bond existed in the panel 
structure. 
Analysis of the original ultrasonic inspection scan records of the Apollo 6 adapter 
assembly showed an abnormal condition extending several  feet along a panel internal 
structural  splice in the center of the region where the adapter failed in flight. Nor- 
mally, when a suspect condition was detected during the manufacturing.process, the area 
was X-rayed. If the X-rays confirmed a weak joint o r  bond, a void, o r  a misalined 
component, the fault was repaired. Nevertheless, the anomalous indication at this 
location had been overlooked on the ultrasonic inspection scan record during manufac- 
turing. The void and misalined splice indicated by the observed abnormality caused a 
weakness of sufficient s ize  that the facesheet was blown off by internal pressure build- 
up during launch. 
As a result  of the anomaly investigation by the mission evaluation team, the 
following was  accomplished. 
1. The probable cause was identified. 
2. Similar conditions found on other adapters were repaired. 
3. Vent holes were drilled through the inner facesheet, and cork insulation was  
added on the outer facesheet to reduce the temperature and pressure buildup in the 
honeycomb panels, 
4. Manufacturing assembly techniques and quality control applications were 
modified to avoid repeating the condition on future assemblies. 
5. The fact that the failure was not the result of a basic design deficiency was 
established. 
6. The structural integrity of the adapters for subsequent missions was verified. 
Limited Analysis 
An example of the other extreme in the extent of analysis required was the type 
For example, on the Apollo 11 entry monitor system, an electroluminescent 
of anomaly for which no corrective action was taken because of the nature of the 
failure. 
segment of the velocity counter would not illuminate. A generic o r  design problem was 
considered highly unlikely because of the number of satisfactory activations experienced 
previously. A circuit analysis produced a number of failure mechanisms; however, 
there was no failure history in any of the circuits, This anomaly w a s  typical of random 
failures that could occur. The basic design concept of the spacecraft provided for  
alternate procedures o r  redundant equipment to perform the function; consequently, 
no corrective action was  taken fo r  this and similar problems. 
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Re turned F l igh t  Hardware 
Sometimes, the analysis and resolution could not be completed until the returned 
hardware had been examined in detail. Examples of dependence on flight hardware for 
anomaly resolution were the failure of the Apollo 12 color television camera on the 
lunar surface and the failure of the primary lower equipment bay floodlights on the 
Apollo 7 mission (ref. 2 and appendix). The floodlights were returned because they 
were part of the command module equipment. However, the television camera was 
returned because of the anomaly resolution requirement. 
nally been listed for return stowage. 
gram, see reference 3. 
The camera had not origi- 
For details of the Apollo postflight testing pro- 
U n r etu r ned F I i g h t Hardware 
In general, two types of malfunctioning equipment were not returned. One type 
was  hardware that had been deployed and was operating as par t  of a lunar surface 
science station, such as the Apollo 14 active seismic experiment geophone that was  
producing errat ic  data (appendix). Testing to resolve the problem was accomplished 
by using breadboard equipment in the laboratory and by transmitting commands to the 
science station on the lunar surface. 
The other type of problem equipment that could not be returned was equipment 
located in the lunar module o r  in the service module. Oscillation of fuel cell condenser 
exit temperatures during the Apollo 10 and 11 missions was a good example. See ref-  
erence 4 and the appendix. The fuel cell condenser was mounted in the service module, 
which separates from the command module at the time of entry and is not recoverable. 
Extensive review and analysis of the flight data for all previous missions were neces- 
sary because the condition had been observed on several  missions. 
TYPICAL CAUSES OF ANOMALIES 
The causes of most anomalies were related to manufacturing quality, hardware 
design, or operational procedures or to a combination of these. 
M a n u  fact uri n g  Qua l i t y  
The structural failure of the Apollo 6 adapter w a s  primarily a manufacturing 
quality problem because of the failure to adequately interpret the ultrasonic scan 
record. If the record had been interpreted properly and the fault confirmed by X-ray; 
the correct structural repair  would have been implemented. In addition, there had 
been manufacturing process difficulty in properly alining all structural  par ts  when the 
assembly was prepared for  bonding in the autoclave. Manufacturing quality anomalies 
a lso included irregularities such as improperly torqued screws, incorrectly soldered 
joints, and improperly potted components which resulted from deficient manufacturing 
procedure s . 
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Hardware Design 
System anomalies caused by hardware design deficiencies sometimes occurred 
because all factors that would influence the performance of the system were not 
included in the design criteria or specifications. Because component and system test-  
ing was  based on these cri teria or  specifications, the deficiency could go unnoticed 
during development and qualification tes ts  and not be detected until actual flight condi- 
tions were encountered. A typical illustration w a s  fogging between the panes of the 
Apollo 7 command module windows caused by deposits from the outgassing products of 
the room -temperature -vulcanizing sealing material around the windows. The design 
of the assembly had not required that the sealing material be cured at the operating 
temperature and pressure. Such a curing process would have reduced the amount of 
outgassing during flight. For further discussion of this problem, see  reference 5. 
Other types of design deficiency anomalies were those in which the state of the 
art ha6 advanced o r  additional knowledge and experience in space had been acquired 
following the design and manufacture of the component o r  assembly. An example of 
this type w a s  the cracking solder phenomenon that occurred on electronic hardware 
designed and manufactured before 1967. An investigation, performed at that time 
because of problems with spacecraft and launch vehicle electronics, revealed that 
existing design practices for printed circuit board assemblies did not allow for occur- 
rence of thermal expansion of the assemblies during normal operations. Differences 
in the thermal expansion properties of the board materials, coating materials, pot- 
ting materials, and component lead materials caused s t r e s s  and cracking in the 
soldered connections. The program also resulted in development and publication of 
tested, acceptable design configurations and guidelines for printed circuit board 
assemblies. See references 6 and 7. Many non-mission-critical electronic assemblies 
had been built before that time. Although the assemblies were subjected to additional 
testing and screening, some anomalies did occur as a result  of this design weakness. 
For example, during the Apollo 12  mission, a failure occurred in the mission timer 
tuning fork circuit because of a cracked solder joint in the cordwood construction. 
Electrical components such as resistors,  capacitors, and diodes had been soldered 
between two circuit boards, and the void between the boards had been filled with potting 
compound. 
component leads resulted in solder joint cracks at a board-to-lead connection. Design 
of a new clock, developed for subsequent missions, did not include the cordwood 
construction. 
The thermal expansion differential between the potting compound and the 
Operational P roced u res 
Procedural problems in operating the various systems and equipment were 
usually easy to correct. An example of a procedural problem occurred during the entry 
and landing sequence on the Apollo 1 2  mission. A crewman was  struck by a 
16-millimeter camera that was dislodged from the mounting bracket near the rendez- 
vous window at splashdown. The camera was to have been stowed before landing because 
design of the mounting bracket did not include retention under landing forces. Designa- 
tion of the camera for stowage in the flight plan and the crew checklist on subsequent 
flights precluded recurrence of this incident. 
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The correction of some procedural problems involved both crew training and 
hardware design changes. This type of correction was required after the loss of lunar 
surface television transmission during the Apollo 1 2  mission (appendix and ref. 2). 
It was  found that high-intensity light inputs were received not only during direct point- 
ing at the Sun, but also during normal pointing as a result  of specular reflections from 
objects in the field of view. This problem hastened completion of the development of 
new burn-resistant image sensors. The newly developed tubes were used with success 
on subsequent missions. Operational procedure on la ter  missions was established to 
avoid pointing the television camera at specified light sources. Also, with the addition 
of the lunar roving vehicle having a television camera mount on the Apollo 15 mission, 
remote pointing control from the Mission Control Center freed the flight crew from 
most of this responsibility. 
Another type of procedural problem was illustrated by the short  in-flight life of 
the floodlights in the Apollo 7 command module lower equipment bay (appendix). 
Here, the preflight procedures were modified to ensure sufficient floodlight lifetime 
for mission operations, 
DOCUMENTATION 
Documentation provided, in firm and visible form, definitive information for a 
better understanding of each anomaly throughout the resolution process. Clearly 
written explanations, accompanied by illustrations and data when required to clarify 
o r  back up a point, ensured a common understanding of the status, findings, and final 
resolution of anomalies by management, engineering, and operations personnel. The 
character of the documentation and the scheduling of the documentation also forced 
analysts to organize the work so that the results and conclusions were concurred upon 
by the working groups and reported in an understandable format and in a timely manner. 
During Flight 
During flight, the anomaly resolution activity of the mission evaluation team was 
documented in several different formats, each serving a specific purpose and each 
supporting the other. Communications between the Mission Control Center and the 
Mission Evaluation Room about questions, answers, and specific information concern- 
ing the spacecraft and experiments hardware were documented on a spacecraft- 
analysis/mission-evaluation action request form. This documentation w a s  often the 
written confirmation of concurrent verbal understandings between the two groups, 
sometimes containing additional detail backing up the verbal action. 
of an anomaly was frequently documented for the first time in one of these messages. 
The identification 
The request forms issued by the mission evaluation team, in the form of ques- 
tions, responses, or information, were signed by the originating specialist, by the 
analysis manager or  managers for the system o r  systems affected, by the contractor 
representative to indicate concurrence from the team a t  the contractor facility, and by 
the evaluation team manager to indicate that the contents covered all affected systems. 
Copies of these messages were also forwarded by wire to the contractor, and contrac- 
tor inputs to the team at MSC were documented on similar forms. 
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Because the actions covered by these communications were for real-time deci- 
Sometimes, an immediate 
sions, response time was kept to a minimum. Sometimes, the answer was almost 
instantaneous and required close -knit, alert team action. 
reply required action to achieve a safe standby condition until the results of expedited, 
special ground tests and analysis provided a more permanent, longer range procedure. 
The team handled an average of 325 of these requests for each lunar-landing mission. 
In addition, anomalies were noted briefly in the 2 -hour status reports prepared 
by the analysis managers during the mission. In these reports,  the status of each 
spacecraft system and experiment was presented for each 2-hour period during the 
mission. As a result, a problem would sometimes be described several  places in the 
same report  because of its effect on more than one system. 
tional assurance that team members were aware of problems and trends in other sys-  
tems as well as in their own. 
2-hour reports for the preceding 24 hours. 
This report  provided addi- 
The daily report was,  in essence, a summary of the 
As problems were identified, they were documented on a problem -tracking list, 
which included a statement of the problem as it was  understood at the time, identifica- 
tion of the responsible analysis manager o r  managers, and a brief discussion of the 
problem, including the action in progress and the schedule status of the resolution. 
This list, distributed to team members and posted in the Mission Evaluation Room, 
established a definite point on which to focus direction and continuity of effort so that 
anomaly resolution would be more efficient and effective. Items that had been incor- 
rectly identified as problems because of insufficient o r  misinterpreted information were 
quickly recognized as normal operations, and efforts were directed toward resolving 
the authentic anomalies. 
After Flight 
After flight, the documentation was changed to suit the postmission testing and 
analysis required for anomaly resolution. 
the Problem and Discrepancy 'List. reports, which included separate documentation for 
.each anomaly. Examples of the Problem and Discrepancy List  format for individual 
problems are included in 'the appendix. 
example of the final format for the program. 
The problem -tracking list was expanded into 
The extract from the Apollo 14 mission is an 
The Problem and Discrepancy List was updated frequently as the fast-moving 
resolution process progressed, Statements in each issue of the report  were subject to 
change as the analysis continued and were based on indications at the time the list was 
published. As a result, discussions and conclusions could change significantly from 
issue to issue until final closeout. The changes reflected the progress in the analysis 
and resolution. Because of the frequency of the Apollo missions and the need for cor-  
rective actions before the next flight, this frequently updated format was  a definite 
advantage. 
The Problem and Discrepancy List included problems from the problem -tracking 
list; problems identified during crew debriefings, particularly those pertaining to crew - 
operated equipment; and problems identified during the analysis of the in-flight photog - 
raphy and processed data. There was an average of 72 Problem and Discrepancy List  
i tems fo r  each lunar -landing mission. 
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A report  was published by MSC 30 days af ter  each flight. In the 30-day report, 
the anomalies were identified, the analyses discussed, and the corrective actions 
explained when determined. 
The mission report, published by MSC approximately 90 days after each mission, 
included sections in which each flight anomaly was discussed. Extracts from three 
mission reports a r e  included in the appendix. An average of 35 anomalies were dis- 
cussed in each lunar -landing -mission report. 
Updating and publishing of the Problem and Discrepancy List was continued after 
Cor- publication of the mission report  until all problems could be considered closed. 
rective action was always taken for critical failure modes. When the cause of a critical 
failure could be isolated to no less than two o r  more possibilities, corrective action 
was  taken for each possible cause. A closed problem was  usually one for which the 
cause had been determined and the corrective action w a s  being implemented. A sepa- 
rate anomaly report was  published for each anomaly that was  not resolved and closed 
before publication of the mission report. Examples of anomaly reports are included in 
the appendix. ' 
Continuing Documentation 
Scientific data-gathering equipment and related communications and power equip- 
ment were deployed on the lunar surface by the crewmen on each of the six Apollo 
lunar-landing missions from July 20, 1969 (Apollo l l ) ,  to December 12, 1972 
(Apollo 17). 
return of the crewmen to Earth; therefore, from the standpoint of the experiments 
hardware specialist, the lifetime of each of these missions extends considerably 
beyond splashdown. 
The deployed equipment was designed to continue to provide data after 
Transmission of data from the Apollo 11 station ended on December 14, 1969. 
However, the other five stations were designed for considerably longer lifetimes, and 
communications with all five stations a r e  continuing. Almost all the experiments that 
were deployed and activated continue collecting data, and analysis of the scientific data 
continues. 
The spacecraft-analysis/mission-evaluation action request form is being used 
to provide the documentation of communications between the flight controllers and the 
hardware engineers and scientists in much the same way as during the flight. Problem 
identifications, investigative actions and results, resolutions, and corrective actions 
are documented in this system. The Apollo Program Lunar Surface Equipment Status 
Report has replaced the Problem and Discrepancy List. This report  is issuedat approxi- 
mately 3-month intervals; interim reports a r e  issued i f  an ear l ier  update is required 
for a specific purpose. 
Anomaly resolution documentation was  handled in the same manner for  the two 
particles and fields subsatellites that were launched into lunar orbit from the Apollo 15 
and 16 service modules, The 
Apollo 15 subsatellite mission ended August 23, 1973. 
The Apollo 16 subsatellite mission ended May 29, 1972. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The flight anomaly resolution system, developed and implemented during the 
Apollo Program, was used successfully for  identifying and resolving problems and for 
determining the proper course of action within the relatively short  time frame allowed 
by the Apollo Program schedule of missions. The success of this operation contributed 
to the overall success of the Apollo Program. The primary reasons for the degree of 
success achieved in flight anomaly resolution a re  as follows. 
1. The application of the concept of a mission evaluation team that was knowl- 
edgeable in all hardware systems serving as an integral part  of the mission team 
while retaining the freedom to pursue problem solution to the extent required for 
mission and program success 
2. The selection of the proper personnel for this team, including the specialists, 
the team leaders, and the team manager 
3. The recognition that this team assignment was the prime activity for each 
member during the mission anomaly resolution period 
4. The establishment of an effective interface level for the evaluation team with 
other segments of the overall mission team 
5. The provision to the evaluation team of displays, data, and communications 
necessary for maintaining constant awareness of total system performance as the 
mission progressed 
6. The establishment of a definite point on which to focus direction and continuity 
of effort through a timely documentation system 
7. The implementation of a flexible updating system for problem resolution 
documentation to ensure a common understanding of problem status by members of the 
overall mission team, including project management 
8. The consistent application of the premise that, before any anomaly was con- 
sidered resolved, it was necessary 
a. That the details of how each affected system, component, o r  circuit func- 
tioned normally, and .its purpose, be understood 
b. That the details of the anomalous condition be understood 
c. That the relationship of the affected function with other system functions 
and with the total mission be understood 
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d. That the corrective action be proved by test and/or analysis 
e. That the responses and documentation be reduced to the most practical 
and simple terms to ensure clarity and common understanding 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, September 17, 1974 
914 -89 -00 -00 -72 
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APPENDIX 
EXAMPLES OF PROGRESSIVE DOCUMENTATION OF ANOMALY RESOLUTION 
Extracts from the anomaly resolution documentation system a r e  included because 
the changes in the documentation from issue to issue reflect the progress  made in the 
anomaly resolution process. The ser ies  of reports also illustrates some of the many 
conditions that influence the resolution process. The reports included a r e  as follows. 
1. Extracts from Problem and Discrepancy List reports 
a. Apollo 12, December 5, 1969, GFE-1 
b. Apollo 12, December 16, 1969, GFE-1 
c. Apollo 14, April 12, 1971, ALSEP-18 
d. Apollo 14, May 14, 1971, ALSEP-18 
e. Apollo 14, July 15, 1971, ALSEP-18 
2. Extracts from mission reports 
a. Apollo 12 Mission Report, March 1970, Section 14. 3 . 1  
b. Apollo 14 Mission Report, April 1971, Section 14.4. 7 
c. Apollo 7 Mission Report, December 1968, Section 11.21 
3. Complete Reports 
a. Apollo 14 Mission Anomaly Report No. 6, December 1972 
b. Apollo 7 Mission Anomaly Report No. 3, February 1969 
C. Apollo 10 and 11 Missions Anomaly Report No. 1, April 1970 
The four problems selected were among the less  complex examples available. 
Resolution of the Apollo 12 lunar surface television camera problem involved examina- 
tion of the flight hardware, which was returned as a result of the problem. It was an 
obvious component failure and w a s  resolved quickly. The problem hastened completion 
of the development of an improved image sensor. 
Resolution of the Apollo 14 active seismic experiment geophone problem required 
testing by telemetry uplink commands to the experiment and breadboard bench tes ts  on 
the ground because the flight hardware had been deployed on the lunar surface. The 
problem occurred after completion of the flight and was not resolved before publication 
of the mission report. The progress made in the resolution process,  including changes 
in the conclusions from issue to issue, is apparent in the extracts from the reports. 
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Resolution of the Apollo 7 command module floodlight problem involved examina- 
tion of the flight hardware as well as testing to determine expected lamp life and to 
develop proper preflight procedures. The flight hardware was available since it was  
par t  of the returned command module. 
A s  described in the anomaly report, the fuel cell  condenser exit-temperature 
oscillations encountered on the Apollo 11 mission had been observed on several 
missions. Analysis in greater depth was required to  understand the condition. The 
resolution included a detailed analysis of the flight data. 
APOLLO 12 LUNAR SURFACE COLOR TELEVI S l O N  CAMERA FA1 LURE 
The loss of the Apollo 12 color television picture occurred when the camera 
was inadvertently pointed toward the Sun while being transferred to the lunar 
surface from the modular equipment stowage assembly of the lunar module. The 
permanent loss resulted from both a crew operational procedure problem and a 
design weakness because the image sensor was susceptible to almost immediate 
damage if  exposed to high-intensity light. Ground tes ts  performed on similar 
equipment and on the returned hardware revealed the following. 
I 1. That light overstress from direct sunlight would immediately damage the 
I image sensor 
2. That high-intensity light from highly specular reflections, as well as direct 
sunlight, would damage the image sensor 
3. That an image sensor more resistant to damage by high-intensity light was 
necessary 
4. That improved pointing procedures and controls were needed 
The cause of the problem was closed out in the documents that follow. The corrective 
action, which continued after the publication of these documents, produced a satis- 
factory image sensor and a remote-control camera-pointing system for  subsequent 
missions. 
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EXTRACT 
TIME : 
DESCRIPTION: 
DISCUSSION: 
I N  PROGRESS: 
Apollo 12 Problem and Discrepancy List 
December 5 ,  1969 
During f i r s t  ex t ravehicu lar  a c t i v i t y  at 116 hours 
Lunar su r face  co lo r  t e l e v i s i o n  camera d id  not  ope ra t e  
a f t e r  deployment from lunar module. 
The camera provided s a t i s f a c t o r y  t e l e v i s i o n  coverage f o r  
approximately 40 minutes.  
t i o n ,  t h e  p i c t u r e  f a i l e d  when the  tube w a s  apparent ly  ex- 
posed t o  d i r e c t  s u n l i g h t  o r  d i r e c t  r e f l e c t i o n  from highly  
specular  lunar module sur faces .  
Camera i s  now i n  Lunar Receiving Laboratory and w i l l  be 
r e l eased  on December 6,  1969. 
t e s t i n g  w i l l  be  performed a t  MSC: 
1. Determine whether t h e  co lor  wheel i s  r o t a t i n g ;  i f  pos- 
2. Disable t h e  automatic l i g h t  c o n t r o l  c i r c u i t  and eva lua te  
When moved t o  a d i f f e r e n t  loca-  
After r e l e a s e ,  t h e  fol lowing 
s i b l e ,  without removing t h e  camera case.  
t he  t o t a l  video s igna l  t o  determine t h e  ex ten t  of v id icon  
damage. 
3. Perform a mechanicalfvisual  inspec t ion  of t h e  equipment 
t o  determine i f  any other  damage was incur red  and i f  
extreme hea t ing  had been experienced by t h e  camera. 
This  t a s k  w i l l  be completed wi th in  two weeks a f t e r  r e c e i p t  
o f  camera. 
COMPLETION : January 21 ,  1970 
ASSIGNED TO: Kingsley 
17 
EXTRACT 
Apollo 12 Problem and Discrepancy List 
December 16, 1969 
TIME : During f i r s t  e x t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  a t  116 hours 
DESCRIPTION: Lunar su r face  c o l o r  t e l e v i s i o n  camera d i d  not  ope ra t e  
a f t e r  deployment from l u n a r  module. 
DISCUSSION: The camera provided s a t i s f a c t o y :  t e l e v i s i o n  coverage f o r  
approximately 40 minutes. 
t i o n ,  t h e  p i c t u r e  f a i l e d  when t h e  tube w a s  appa ren t ly  ex- 
posed t o  d i r e c t  s u n l i g h t  o r  d i r e c t  r e f l e c t i o n  from highly  
specu la r  l u n a r  module s u r f a c e s .  
A f t e r  decontamination and c l ean ing ,  t h e  camera w a s  i n s p e c t e d  
and then  opera ted .  The p i c t u r e  t h a t  r e s u l t e d  w a s  t h e  same 
as t h a t  rece ived  at t h e  end of t h e  Apollo 12 t r ansmiss ion .  
The c o l o r  wheel could be heard tu rn ing  wi th in  t h e  camera, 
and when t h e  l ens  was removed, t h e  t u r n i n g  w a s  viewed 
d i r e c t l y .  The power t o  t h e  camera was turned  on and o f f  
s e v e r a l  t imes t o  see  t h e  wheel start and s t o p .  By c u t t i n g  
one wi re ,  t h e  Automatic Light Level c o n t r o l  c i r c u i t  was 
d i s a b l e d ,  and t h e  camera tu rned  t a c k  on. A w e l l  def ined  
image WBS v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  p i c t u r e  i n  t h e  a r e a  which w a s  
formerly black.  This b lack  represented  t h e  undmaged a r e a  
o f  t h e  image sensor  t a r g e t .  This t e s t  proved conc lus ive ly  
t h a t  t h e  Apollo 12 f a i l u r e  was due t o  a damaged i m a g e  sen- 
s o r .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  c m e r a  c o n t r a c t o r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  damaged a 
s i m i l a r  image senso r  by apply ing  b r i g h t  l i g h t  l e v e l s .  The 
r e s u l t i n g  p i c t u r e  w a s  similar t o  t h a t  of t h e  Apollo 12 
camera. 
Subjec t  t o  Apollo CCB approval on December 12,  1969, a l e z s  
cover w i l l  be provided f o r  t h e  Apollo 13 camera. Opera t iona l  
procedures and t r a i n i n g  w i l l  a l s o  be improved t o  reduce prob- 
a b i l i t y  of exposure. 
are a lso  being eva lua ted .  
When moved t o  a d i f f e r e n t  loca-  
Automatic p r o t e c t i v e  des ign  approaches 
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EXTRACT 
Apollo 12 Mission Report 
March, 1970 
l k .  3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
14.3.1 Color Te lev is ion  F a i l u r e  
The c o l o r  t e l e v i s i o n  camera provided s a t i s f a c t o r y  t e l e v i s i o n  cover- 
age f o r  approximately 40 minutes at the  beginning of  t h e  first ext rave-  
h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  video d i sp lay  showed only whi te  i n  an 
i r r e g u l a r  p a t t e r n  i n  t h e  upper p a r t  of t h e  p i c t u r e  and b lack  i n  t h e  re- 
mainder. The camera w a s  t u rned  o f f  a f t e r  repea ted  a t tempts  by t h e  crew 
t o  r e s t o r e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  p i c t u r e .  
Ground tes t s  us ing  an Apollo-type image senso r  (secondary e l e c t r o n  
conduct ing v id icon  t u b e )  exposed t h e  camera system t o  extreme l i g h t  
l e v e l s .  The r e s u l t i n g  image on a monitor w a s  very s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  seen  
after t h e  f l i g h t  camera failure.  
After d e c o n t m i n a t i o n  and c leaning ,  t h e  f l i g h t  camera w a s  i n spec ted  
and power w a s  appl ied .  The image, as viewed on a monitor ,  w a s  t h e  same as 
t h a t  last seen from t h e  l u n a r  su r face .  The automatic  l i g h t - l e v e l  c o n t r o l  
c i r c u i t  w a s  d i sab led  by c u t t i n g  one wire. The camera t h e n  reproduced good 
scene d e t a i l  i n  t h a t  area of t h e  p i c tu re  which had previous ly  been b l ack ,  
v e r i f y i n g  t h a t  t h e  b l ack  a r e a  of t h e  t a r g e t  w a s  undamaged, as shown i n  
f i g u r e  14-39. This  f ind ing  a l s o  proved t h a t  t h e  combination of  normal 
automatic  l i g h t  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n  and a damaged image-tube t a r g e t  caused t h e  
loss of  p i c t u r e .  In  t h e  process  of moving t h e  camera on t h e  l u n a r  sur- 
f a c e ,  a po r t ion  of t h e  t a r g e t  i n  the  secondary-electron conduc t iv i ty  
v id i ccn  must have rece ived  a high solar i n p u t ,  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  
sun o r  from some h igh ly  r e f l e c t i v e  su r face .  That p o r t i o n  of t h e  t a r g e t  
was des t royed ,  as  w a s  evidenced by t h e  white  appearance of t h e  upper 
p a r t  of  t h e  p i c t u r e .  
T ra in ing  and ope ra t iona l  procedures ,  i nc lud ing  t h e  use of a l e n s  cap ,  
are be ing  changed t o  reduce t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  exposing t h e  image sensor .  
t o  extreme l i g h t  l e v e l s .  In  add i t ion ,  des ign  changes a r e  be ing  considered 
t o  inc lude  automatic  p r o t e c t i o n ,  such as t h e  use of  an image senso r  which 
is less s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  dacage f r c z  i n t e n s e  light l e v e l s .  
This  anamaly i s  c losed .  
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EXTRACT 
Apollo 12 Mission Report 
March, 1970 
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Figure 14-39. - Secondary e l e c t r o n  conduct iv i ty  tube  i n  t h e  
c o l o r  t e l e v i s i o n .  
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APOLLO 14 ACTIVE SEI S M I  C EXPERIMENT - ERRATl C DATA 
FROM NUMBER 3 GEOPHONE 
The number 3 geophone data from the Apollo 14 active seismic experiment became 
erratic. These data had been satisfactory during crew thumper operation on the lunar 
surface and also during high-bit-rate listening periods during the first 49 days after 
deployment at the lunar surface site. Tests of the emplaced flight hardware were per- 
formed by transmitting selected command sequences to the experiment, and the telem- 
etry data and experiment circuits were analyzed, 
breadboard bench tests. Components taken from the lot that included the malfunctioning 
component were tested for a possible generic problem that would require correction 
before the next mission. 
The problem was duplicated by 
The progressive steps in the analyses a re  apparent in the documents that follow. 
They reflect a better understanding of the cause as more results of tests and analyses 
became available. As indicated in the final anomaly report, the resolution also included 
an analysis of how the data from the number 3 sensor could be used if  required for  the 
analysis of a specific event. 
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Apollo 14 Problem and Discrepancy List 
April 12, 1971 
I t a l i c s  indicate change from previous issue.  
PROBLEM AND DlSCRE PANCY L I S T  N ~ .  ALSEP-I 8 
Statement o f  Problem: 
Active seismic experiment no. 3 geophone data became errat ic .  
Discussion: 
On March 26, the experiment was turned on i n  the l is tening mode (high b i t  
ratel  and Geophone #3 was spiking t o  of f -scale  high. 
was transmitted to  a l l  three geophone channels. 
scale high simultaneous with the application of the calibration pulse and 
stayed off-scale high fo r  the remainder o f  the l is tening period. 
one second period’ when the calibration pulse was present, Geophone #3 data 
showed four negative going pulses from of f -scale  high. 
shorter than corresponding osc i l l a t ions  on Geophones 1 and 2 and decreased 
from the f i r s t  t o  the fourth.  The characteris t ics  of these pulses indicated 
that Geophone #3  channel was operating a t  a higher gain than Geophones 1 and 
2 during the calibration period. 
had to  be i n  the logarithmic compressor i n  the Geophone #3  amplif ier chain. 
Signals are coupled i n t o  the logarithmic cwnpressor through an input coupling 
capacitor which would block any dc voltage which would have t o  b.e present t o  
drive the output voltage of f -scale  high f o r  long periods (more than 1 or 2 
minutes). 
The logarithmic compressor i s  basically an inverting amplif ier with exponen- 
t i a l  negative feedback. 
The cal ibrat ion command 
Geophone #3 channel went o f f -  
During the 
Pl lse  widths were 
Circuit  analysis indicated that  the problem 
Two diode connected transis tors  between the output 
(see continuation shee t )  
Notes: 1. Third  lunar day data. 5 t o  1 5  minutes of high b i t  rate  data da i l y ,  
April 4 - 1 2  
Preliminary analysis A p r i l  1 - 8 - Complete 2. 
3. Bench checks and analysis.  
Personnel Assigned: 
J .  Harris, Bendk, Geo tech, Gadbois 
Conclusions: 
* 
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Apollo 14 Problem and Discrepancy List 
April 12, 1971 
I t a l i c s  indicate change from previous issue.  
PROBLEM AND DISCREPANCY L I S T  N,, . .ALSEP-l8 
CON TIN U AT IO N SHE E T  
Discussion: 
and input of the amplifier supply the feedback. 
f o r  posi t ive  going and the second f o r  negative going input signals.  
diodes fo r  a l l  three geophone channels 12 per c.hanne1) are physically lo- 
cated i n  an oven which controls t he i r  temperature a t  105OC. 
Analysis indicates that the most probable cause of  the problem i s .  an in-  
termittent open c i rcu i t  i n  the diode feedback path. This would allow the 
amplifier input transistor t o  saturate, driving the output off-scale high. 
m e n  signals large enough t o  drive the input stage act  of saturation were 
present, the output would then respond and amplifier gain would not be 
compressed. 
l'uo copper paths conduct the feedback diodes to  the logarithmic compressor 
amplif ier.  
characterist ics.  
phones by energizing 3 relays, the relay contact transfer shock could then 
disturb the solder crack and ei ther  open or  close the feedback path. 
The problem was detected during the lunar night a t  the experiment location. 
Under lunar night conditions the thermal gradient between the oven (105°C) 
and the r e s t  of the electronics ( 4 . 4 O C )  was m a x i m .  
d ients  cause mechanical stresses by di f ferent ial  thermal expansion, the 
large temperature gradient between the oven and the r e s t  of the experiment 
electronics probably caused the crack. 
A breadboard of the logarithmic compressor w i l l  be constructed and the 
diode feedback loop w i l l  be opened to  duplicate the experiment data. 
The f i r s t  diode i s  used 
The 
A solder crack i n  e i ther  path would then re su l t  i n  the data 
Since the calibration uoltage i s  applied to  the 3 geo- 
Since thermal gra- 
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14.4.7 Active Seismic Geophone 3 Elec t ronic  C i r c u i t  E r r a t i c  
The experiment was turned on i n  t h e  l i s t e n i n g  mode on March 26, 
1971, and geophone 3 d a t a  were sp ik ing  of f -sca le  high ( f i g .  14-34). 
When t h e  geophone channels were c a l i b r a t e d ,  t h e  geophone 3 channel went 
of f - sca le  high simultaneously with t h e  start o f  t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pulse  
and s t ayed  of f -sca le  high f o r  t h e  remainder o f  t h e  l i s t e n i n g  per iod.  
During t h e  1-second pe r iod  when t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pu l se  w a s  p r e s e n t ,  d a t a  
from geophones 1 and 2 showed t h e  normal 7-hertz r i n g i n g  caused by t h e  
c a l i b r a t i o n  pulse .  However, geophone 3 da ta  showed four  negative-going 
spikes  coincident  with t h e  f i r s t  four  nega t ive  h a l f  cyc les  of t h e  r ing-  
ing on t h e  o ther  two channels.  The sp ikes  decreased i n  du ra t ion  from 
t h e  f i r s t  t o  t h e  las t ,  t h e  last  having an amplitude of 90 percent  of 
f u l l  s c a l e  (p lus  2.5 v o l t s  t o  minus 2.0 v o l t s ) .  During t h e  t i m e  t h a t  
t h i s  pu l se  was p r e s e n t ,  t h e  s i g n a l  on channel 2 changed from minus 2.2 
v o l t s  t o  minus 2.35 v o l t s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  channel 3 w a s  ope ra t ing  a t  
an apparent g a i n  of 30 times t h e  channel 2 ga in .  
A s  shown i n  f i g u r e  14-35, each geophone channel c o n s i s t s  of a geo- 
phone, an input  preampl i f ie r ,  a low-pass f i l t e r ,  and a loga r i thmic  com- 
pressor  ampl i f ie r .  
inst rumentat ion system. The logari thmic compressor is b a s i c a l l y  an in-  
v e r t i n g  ampl i f ie r  w i t h  exponent ia l  negat ive feedback. 
nected t r a n s i s t o r s  between t h e  output  and input  of t h e  ampl i f ie r  supply 
t h e  feedback. 
f o r  negative-going input  s i g n a l s .  
channels (two per  channel)  are p h y s i c a l l y  l o c a t e d  i n  an oven which con- 
t r o l s  t h e i r  temperature at  105' C. 
The output  of the loga r i thmic  compressor feeds t h e  
Two diode-con- 
The f i r s t  diode i s  used f o r  posit ive-going and t h e  second 
The diodes f o r  a l l  three geophone 
NASA-S-7 1-1 703 
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Figure 14-35.- Typ ica l  geophone 'channel.  
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It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  i s  i r l  t h e  logar i thmic  compression 
a m p l i f i e r  because s i g n a l s  a r e  coupled in to  i t  through an inpu t  coupling 
c a p a c i t o r .  
ceding s t ages  which would be requi red  t o  d r i v e  t h e  output o f f - sca l e  high. 
Analysis i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  most probable cause of t h e  problem i s  an 
i n t e r m i t t e n t  open c i r c u i t  i n  t h e  diode feedback path.  
t h e  ampl i f i e r  input  t r a n s i s t o r  t o  s a t u r a t e ,  d r iv ing  t h e  output  o f f - sca l e  
high.  When s i g n a l s  l a r g e  enough t o  drive t h e  input  s t a g e  out  o f  s a t u r a -  
t i o n  were p r e s e n t ,  t h e  output  would then respond and t h e  output s i g n a l  
would not  be compressed. 
This capac i to r  would block any o f f s e t  vo l t ages  from t h e  pre- 
This would allow 
The experiment e l e c t r o n i c s  uses llcordwoodl' cons t ruc t ion  of t h e  type 
which has caused s o l d e r  cracks i n  other  equipment. Two copper paths  con- 
duct t h e  feed-back diodes t o  t h e  logarithmic compressor a m p l i f i e r ,  A 
so lde r  crack i n  e i t h e r  pa th  would then r e s u l t  i n  t h e  d a t a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
There are 10  such so lde r  j o i n t s  f o r  each geophone ( f i g .  14-36): 
fou r  on t h e  oven t e rmina l  boa ra ,  four  on t h e  mother board ,  one on t h e  
top  board of t h e  l o g  compressor module, and one on t h e  bottom board o f  
t h e  log  compressor module. The one most l i k e l y  t o  f a i l  f i r s t  i s  on t h e  
t o p  board of t h e  l o g  compressor module. Cont inui ty  at  t h e  j o i n t  re- 
covers as long as t h e  c rack  c loses  during t h e  l u n a r  day. 
NASA-S-7 1-1 704 
7 Most likely cracked joint 
Oven 
terminal 
board - 
Motherboard 
' Log compressor 
top board 
- Log compressor 
bottom boad 
Figure 14-36.- Suspected cracked s o l d e r  j o i n t s  i n  ampl i f i e r .  
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The loe; compressor modules f o r  geophones 1 and 2 a r e  of t h e  same 
type  cons t ruc t ion .  Since these  a r e  loca t ed  s l i g h t l y  f u r t h e r  from t h e  
oven than  t h e  one f o r  geqphone 3,  t h e  maximum temperature may not  be 
q u i t e  as high.  As a r e s u l t ,  it may t ake  longer  f o r  them t o  c rack ,  if 
a t  a l l .  
Systems t e s t i n g  included opera t iona l  thermal cyc l ing  t e s t s  over t h e  
temperature range f o r  l una r  day and n i g h t .  
a r e  a func t ion  of t i m e  as we l l  as temperature,  and apparent ly  t h e  ground 
test cyc le  d id  not  allow enough time f o r  a c reep  f a i l u r e .  This equipment 
w a s  designed and b u i l t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  t i n e  when it w a s  found t h a t  cordwood 
cons t ruc t ion  wi th  so ldered  j o i n t s  was unsa t i s f ac to ry .  
However, cracked so lde r  j o i n t s  
A breadboard o f  t h e  logarithmic compressor has been cons t ruc ted ,  
and t h e  diode feedback loop w i l l  be opened t o  d u p l i c a t e  t h e  experiment 
da ta .  The mechanical design of t h e  logar i thmic  compressor w i l l  be re- 
viewed t o  determine t h e  'changes t h a t  must b e  made t o  prevent so lde r  
cracks on Apollo 16.  The a c t i v e  seismic experiment is  not  c a r r i e d  on 
Apollo 15. 
Procedural changes under cons idera t ion  inc lude  opera t ion  of t h e  
m e n  t o  maintain compressor module temperature because t h e  so lde r  j o i n t  
which i s  most l i k e l y  cracked is i n  conlpression ( s t r o n g e r )  a t  t h e  h ighe r  
temperature.  
This anomaly i s  open. 
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PROBLEM AND DISCREPANCY LIST N ~ .  ALSEP-18 
Statement o f  Problem : 
Active seismic experiment no. 3 geophone d a t a  became e r r a t i c .  
Discussion: 
On March 26, t h e  experiment w a s  tu rned  on i n  t h e  l i s t e n i n g  mode (high b i t  
rate) and geophone #3 w a s  sp ik ing  t o  of f - sca le  high.  
was t ransmi t ted  t o  a l l  t h r e e  geophone channels. 
s c a l e  high simultaneous with t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pulse  and 
s tayed o f f - s c a l e  high f o r  t h e  remainder of t h e  l i s t e n i n g  per iod .  
one second per iod when t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pulse  was p r e s e n t ,  geophone #3  d a t a  
showed four  nega t ive  going pulses  from of f -sca le  high.  Pulse  widths were 
s h o r t e r  than corresponding o s c i l l a t i o n s  on geophones 1 and 2 and decreased 
from t h e  f i r s t  t o  t h e  four th .  The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e s e  pulses  ind ica ted  
t h a t  geophone #3  channel w a s  opera t ing  at a higher  ga in  than geophones 1 and 
2 during t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  per iod.  C i r c u i t  ana lys i s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  problem 
had t o  b e  i n  t h e  logari thmic compressor i n  t h e  geophone #3  a m p l i f i e r  chain.  
Signals  are coupled i n t o  t h e  logari thmic compressor through an input  coupl ing 
capac i tor  which would block any dc vol tage  which would have t o  be present  t o  
dr ive t h e  output  vo l tage  o f f - s c a l e  high f o r  long per iods (more than 1 o r  2 
minutes ) . 
The c a l i b r a t i o n  command 
Geophone # 3  channel went o f f -  
During t h e  
The logari thmic compressor i s  b a s i c a l l y  an i n v e r t i n g  ampl i f ie r  with exponen- 
tial negat ive feedback. Two diode connected t r a n s i s t o r s  between t h e  output  
( see  cont inuat  ion s h e e t )  
Schedule: 
Notes: 1. Third l u n a r  day data .  5 t o  1 5  minutes of high b i t  r a t e  d a t a  d a i l y ,  
2. 
3. Bench checks and ana lys i s  
Apr i l  4 - 12 
Prel iminary a n a l y s i s  Apr i l  1 - 8 - complete 
Personnel Assigned: 
J. Harr i s ,  Bendix, Geotech, Gadbois 
Conclusions: 
28 
EXTRACT 
Apollo 14 Problem and Discrepancy List 
May 14, 1971 
I t a l i c s  indicate change from previous issue.  
PROBLEM AND DISCREPANCY L I S T  N ~ .  ALSEP-18 
CONTINUATION SHEET . 
Discussion: 
and input  of t h e  ampl i f ie r  supply t h e  feedback. The f i r s t  diode i s  used 
f o r  p o s i t i v e  going and t h e  second f o r  negative going input  s i g n a l s .  The 
diodes f o r  a l l  t h r e e  geophone channels ( 2  per  channel) are phys ica l ly  lo- 
ca ted  i n  an oven which cont ro ls  t h e i r  temperature a t  105OC. 
Analysis i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  most probable cause of  t h e  problem i s  an in- 
t e r m i t t e n t  open c i r c u i t  i n  t h e  diode feedback path.  This would allow t h e  
ampl i f ie r  input  t r a n s i s t o r  t o  s a t u r a t e ,  d r iv ing  t h e  output  of f - sca le  high. 
When s i g n a l s  l a r g e  enough t o  d r i v e  t h e  input s tage  out of  s a t u r a t i o n  were 
present ,  t h e  output  would then respond and ampl i f ie r  ga in  would not be com- 
pressed. 
The experiment e lectronics  used "cordwood" construction of the t y p e  which 
has caused solder cracks i n  other equipment. 
feedback diodes t o  the logarithmic compressor amplifier. 
e i ther  path would then re su l t  i n  the data characteris t ics .  
There are ten  suck solder j o i n t s  f o r  each geophone: 
m i n a l  board, four on the mother board, one on the top board o f  the log com- 
pressor module and one on the bottom board of the log compressor module. 
The one most l i ke l y  t o  f a i l  f i r s t  i s  on the top board of the log compressor 
module. 
ing the lunar day. 
The log compressor modules f o r  geophones 1 and 2 are of the same type con- 
struction. 
one fo r  geophone 3, the mmimwn temperature may not be qui te  as high. 
a resu l t ,  it may take longer f o r  them to crack, i f  a t  a l l .  
A breadboard of  the logarithmic compressor has been constructed and the diode 
feedback loop w i l l  be opened t o  duplicate the experinent data. 
The ac t ive  seismic experiment i s  not on Apollo 15. 
Two copper paths conduct the 
A solder crack i n  
four on the oven ter -  
Continuity a t  the j o i n t  recovers as  long as the crack closes  dur- 
Since these are located s l igh t ly  further  from the oven than the 
As 
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PROBLEM AND DISCREPANCY LIST No.  U E P - 1 8  
Statement o f  Problem: 
Active seismic experiment no. 3 geophone d a t a  became e r r a t i c .  CLOSED 
Discussion: 
On March 26, t h e  experiment w a s  turned on i n  t h e  l i s t e n i n g  mode (high b i t  
r a t e )  and geophone no. 3 w a s  sp ik ing  t o  of f - sca le  high.  The c a l i b r a t i o n  
command w a s  t ransmi t ted  t o  a l l  t h r e e  geophone channels. Geophone no. 3 chan- 
nel  went of f - sca le  high simultaneous wi th  t h e  appl ica t ion  o f  t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  
pulse and s tayed of f -sca le  high f o r  t h e  remainder of t h e  l i s t e n i n g  per iod.  
During t h e  one second per iod when t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pulse  w a s  p r e s e n t ,  geophone 
no. 3 da ta  showed four  negat ive going pulses  .from of f -sca le  high. Pulse  
widths were s h o r t e r  than corresponding o s c i l l a t i o n s  on geophones 1 and 2 and 
decreased from t h e  f i r s t  t o  t h e  four th .  The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  t h e s e  pulses  
indicated t h a t  geophone no. 3 channel was opera t ing  a t  a higher  gain than geo- 
phones 1 and 2 during t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  per iod.  C i r c u i t  a n a l y s i s  ind ica ted  t h a t  
the problem had t o  be i n  t h e  logari thmic compressor i n  t h e  geophone no. 3 
amplif ier  chain. 
Signals a r e  coupled i n t o  t h e  logari thmic compressor through an input  coupl ing 
capaci tor  which would block .any dc vol tage  which would have t o  b e  present  t o  
dr ive t h e  output vo l tage  of f -sca le  high f o r  long per iods (more than 1 o r  2 
minutes ) . 
( s e e  cont inua t ion  s h e e t )  
Schedule: 
Data Review Complete 
Analysis Complete 
Tests (Identify in Note) Complete 
Changes (Identify in Note) 
Noten: 1. Third lunar  day data .  5 t o  15 minutes of  high b i t  r a t e  d a t a  d a i l y ,  
Apri l  4 - 12 
2. Mathematical analysis,  May 11 
3. Bench checks and analysis.  Breadboard t e s t s ,  May 31 
4.  Review. June 3 
Personnel Assigned: 
J. Harris ,  Bendix, Geotech, Gadbois 
COnClUSiOnS: Problem w a s  caused by un intermit tent  f a i l u r e  (open) i n  the posi t ive 'going 
diode wired transis tor  i n  the log compressor f o r  the no. 3 geophone. 
i s t o r  fa i lu re  appears t o  be an isolated case rather than a generic condition. 
Trans- 
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PROBLEM AND DISCREPANCY L I S T  N ~ .  ALSEP-18 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
Discussion : 
The logari thmic compressor i s  b a s i c a l l y  an inver t ing  ampl i f ie r  with exponen- 
t i a l  negative feedback. 
and input  of t h e  ampl i f ie r  supply t h e  feedback. The f i r s t  diode is  used 
f o r  p o s i t i v e  going and t h e  second f o r  negative going input  s i g n a l s .  The 
diodes fo r  a l l  t h r e e  geophone channels ( 2  per channel)  are phys ica l ly  lo- 
ca ted  i n  an oven which cont ro ls  t h e i r  temperature at  105OC. 
Mathematical analysis and breadboard t e s t s  show that  the cause of  the prob- 
lem i s  an in termi t ten t  fa i lure  (open) i n  the pos i t ive  going diode wired 
transis tor .  
ing the output of f -scale  high. 
put stage out of  saturation are present, the output responds, and amplifier 
gain w i l l  not  be compressed. 
No previous fa i lures  of t h i s  type have been experienced during the develop- 
ment and t e s t  program. 
(2if2484-2B) i s  connected d irec t ly  t o  the case without a lead. 
and base are connected from pin  t o  chip by small alwninum leads which could 
possibly break and again make contact with temperature changes or by mechan- 
i ca l  shock from nearby relay actuation. 
The experinent e lectronics  uses "cordWood" construction of  the type that has 
caused solder cracks i n  other equipment however, a cracked solder j o i n t  i n  
the cordwood construction, i n  t h i s  case, w i l l  not  produce the f l i g h t  re- 
su l t s .  
wood construction has averted a cracked solder j o i n t ,  - a t  least ,  f o r  the 
time being. 
The next mission scheduled for  the active seismic experiment i s  Apollo 1 6 .  
Two diode connected t r a n s i s t o r s  between t h e  output 
This allows the amplifier input t rans is tor  t o  saturate, driv- 
When signals large enough t o  drive the in-  
The col lector  of the intermit tent  t rans is tor  
The emitter 
Apparently some inadvertent s train r e l i e f  configuration i n  the cord- 
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ACTIVE SEISMIC EXPERIMENT GEOPHONE 3 DATA ERRATIC 
STATEMENT OF ANOMALY 
During t h e  h igh-b i t - ra te  l i s t e n i n g  mode per iod  on March 26, 1971, t h e  
geophone 3 d a t a  showed i n t e r m i t t e n t  spikes going o f f - sca l e  high. When t h e  
c a l i b r a t i o n  s i g n a l  was  appl ied  t o  a l l  three geophones, t h e  geophone 3 d a t a  
went of f - sca le  h i zh  f o r  t h e  remainder of t h e  l i s t e n i n g  pe r iod .  
response w a s  observed dur ing  t h e  succeeding weekly l i s t e n i n g  mode per iods.  
A similar 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The a c t i v e  seismic experiment cons i s t s  of an a r r a y  o f  t h r e e  geo- 
phones, a thumper with 21 i n i t i a t o r s  (de tona to r s ) ,  a mortar package wi th  
fou r  rocket-launched grenades,  a c e n t r a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  assembly, and con- 
nec t ing  cabl ing.  The t h r e e  geophones are deployed on t h e  l u n a r  su r face  
i n  a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  a t  150-foot i n t e r v a l s  and are used t o  t r a n s l a t e  physi- 
c a l  su r f ace  movement i n t o  e l e c t r i c a l  s igna l s .  The thumper i n i t i a t o r s ,  
f i r e d  a t  i n t e r v a l s  along a pa th  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  geophone l i n e ,  and t h e  
mortar grenades,  p rope l led  t o  d i s t ances  of 500 t o  5000 f e e t  away from t h e  
geophone l i n e ,  a r t i f i c i a l l y  produce seismic waves which are de tec t ed  by 
t h e  geophones. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  geophones monitor n a t u r a l l y  produced lu-  
nar  seismic a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  3 t o  250 Hz range. 
The cons t ruc t ion  of a geophone i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  1. A c o i l  of cop- 
per  w i r e  (seismic mass) is suspended i n  a magnetic f i e l d  by f l a t  c a n t i -  
l e v e r  sp r ings  which a l s o  guide t h e  c o i l  v e r t i c a l l y .  The magnetic f i e l d  
i s  produced by a permanent magnet frame. 
c o i l  and t h e  frame genera tes  an output vo l t age  across  t h e  c o i l ,  and t h i s  
vo l t age  i s  suppl ied  through con tac t s  of t h e  c a l i b r a t e  r e l a y  ( f i g .  2 )  t o  
t h e  input  o f  a p reampl i f i e r .  The preampl i f ie r  ou tput  i s  then  f ed  through 
a low-pass f i l t e r  t o  a logar i thmic  compression c i r c u i t .  S igna l s  are cou- 
p led  i n t o  t h i s  c i r c u i t  through an input coupling c a p a c i t o r  which would 
normally block any d-c vo l t age  t h a t  must be  p re sen t  t o  d r i v e  t h e  output  
vo l t age  o f f - sca l e  high f o r  long periods (more than  1 o r  2 minutes ) .  The 
output  s i g n a l  from t h e  logar i thmic  compression c i r c u i t  ( t h e  logar i thm o f  
t h e  inpu t  s i g n a l )  is  suppl ied  t o  t h e  te lemet ry  system. 
Re la t ive  motion between t h e  
The logar i thmic  compression c i r c u i t  provides adequate r e s o l u t i o n  when 
s m a l l  s i g n a l s  a r e  p r e s e n t ,  but  a l s o  has t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  respond t o  t h e  
expected 60- t o  8 0 - d ~  s i g n a l  range. The c i r c u i t  i s  b a s i c a l l y  an i n v e r t i n g  
ampl i f i e r  with exponent ia l  nega t ive  feedback. Two diode-connected t r a n -  
s i s t o r s ,  i n  p a r a l l e l ,  between t h e  output and input  of t h e  ampl i f i e r  supply 
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Figure 1.- Cutaway view of geophone. 
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t h e  feedback s i g n a l  ( f i g .  2 ) .  
i t ive-going  inpu t  signals, and t h e  o the r  i s  used f o r  t h e  negativ.e-going 
input  s igna l s .  The feedback trai-sistors f o r  all t h r e e  geophone channels 
(two pe r  channel)  are phys ica l ly  loca t ed  i n  an oven t h a t  main ta ins  t h e i r  
temperature  a t  105' C. 
One of  the t r a n s i s t o r s  i s  used f o r  t h e  pos- 
The geophone i s  c a l i b r a t e d  by applying a f ixed-ampli tude,  1-second 
c u r r e n t  p u l s e  t o  t h e  geophone c o i l .  
t o  a new ba lance  p o s i t i o n .  The c o i l  w i l l  o s c i l l a t e  about t h e  new posi-  
t i o n  u n t i l  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  damp ou t .  The geophone resonant  frequency, 
s e n s i t i v i t y ,  and damping f a c t o r  can then be  determined from t h e  damped 
o s c i l l a t i o n  waveform generated wi th in  the c o i l .  
The cu r ren t  f o r c e s  t h e  c o i l  t o  move 
DISCUSSION 
The a c t i v e  seismic experiment w a s  i n i t i a l l y  tu rned  on i n  t h e  thumper 
mode with t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  i n  t h e  h igh-b i t - ra te  mode dur ing  luna r  sur- 
f a c e  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t i e s  on February 5 ,  1971. Vibrat ions from each 
of 13 thumper f i r i n g s  were rece ived  by each o f  t h e  t h r e e  geophones and 
t h e  data were t r ansmi t t ed  t o  ea r th .  The experiment was then  commanded 
t o  t h e  standby mode, and w a s  t o  remain i n  t h a t  mode except f o r  30 minutes 
of ope ra t ion  each week i n  t h e  l i s t e n i n g  mode and t h e  h igh-b i t - ra te  mode. 
System opera t ion  w a s  normal during t h e  f i r s t  s i x  weeks; however, du r ing  
t h e  seventh-week monitoring cyc le  (March 26, 19711, at about l u n a r  mid- 
n i g h t ,  t h e  geophone 3 d a t a  were sp ik ing  o f f - sca l e  high.  
All t h r e e  geophone channels were c a l i b r a t e d ,  and t h e  geophone 3 chan- 
n e l  went o f f - sca l e  high simultaneously with t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  c a l i -  
b r a t i o n  pu l se  ( f i g .  3 ) .  The channel stayed o f f - sca l e  high f o r  t h e  remain- 
d e r  of t h e  l i s t e n i n g  per iod .  During t h e  1-second pe r iod  when t h e  c a l i b r a -  
t i o n  pulse  w a s  p re sen t ,  t h e  geophone 3 da t a  showed f o u r  negative-going 
pu l ses  from o f f - sca l e  high. Pulse  widths were s h o r t e r  than  corresponding 
o s c i l l a t i o n s  on geophones 1 and 2 ,  and decreased i n  width from t h e  f i r s t  
t o  t h e  fou r th  pulse .  The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t hese  pu l ses  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e  geophone 3 channel was ope ra t ing  a t  a h igher  ga in  than  geophones 1 
and 2 during t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  pe r iod ,  and t h a t  i t s  output  was b iased  o f f -  
s c a l e  high. 
A f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  geophone, preampl i f ie r ,  o r  f i l t e r  could produce a 
b i a s  o f f s e t  ; however, t h e  compressor input  coupl ing capac i to r  vould block 
t h e  b i a s  o f f s e t  and t h e  output  s igna l  would not remain o f f - sca l e  high.  
Had t h e  inpu t  capac i to r  sho r t ed ,  t h e  output would be s h i f t e d ,  bu t  not of f -  
scale-high.  The f a u l t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  must have been wi th in  t h e  logar i thmic  
compressor c i r c u i t  ( f i g .  2 ) .  
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The f a i l u r e  was dup l i ca t ed  by opening t h e  posi t ive-going diode-wired 
t r a n s i s t o r .  This s a t u r a t e d  t h e  a m p l i f i e r  input  t r a n s i s t o r ,  and drove t h e  
output off-scale  high.  
ou t  of s a t u r a t i o n  were present ,  t h e  output  responded and t h e  a m p l i f i e r  
gain w a s  not  compressed u n t i l  t h e  output  vo l t age  was d r iven  t o  zero.  The 
par t  o f  t h e  signal which went below zero vol tage  w a s  then compressed by 
the  negative-going feedback diode and t h e  narrow pulses  shown i n  f i g u r e  3 
were produced. 
When s i g n a l s  l a r g e  enough t o  d r i v e  t h e  input  s t a g e  
The t r a n s i s t o r  emitter and base are connected from p i n  t o  ch ip  by 
small aluminum wires ( f i g .  4. ). A break i n  one o f  t h e s e  wires, o r  a par- 
t ial  o r  complete bond failure between t h e  wire  and t h e  ch ip  would cause 
t h e  open c i r c u i t .  The elements could a l s o  make contac t  a g a i n - t o  produce 
t h e  i n t e r m i t t e n t  cond i t ion  when mechanically shocked by nearby r e l a y  
actuat ion.  
No f a i l u r e s  of t h i s  t ype  occurred during t h e  development and tes t  
program. To determine i f  a generic  defec t  e x i s t e d ,  a group o f  t e n  t r a n -  
s i s t o r s  from t h e  same l o t  were examined i n t e r n a l l y  and sub jec t ed  t o  t h e r -  
m a l  shock and bond p u l l  tests as w e l l  as e l e c t r i c a l  tests. The t r a n s i s -  
t o r s  were t e s t e d  wi th in  t h e  manufacturer 's  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  l i m i t s  and a l s o  
beyond s p e c i f i c a t i o n  l i m i t s  and were found t o  be s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
With a s i g n i f i c a n t  event ,  such as f i r i n g  t h e  mortar ,  t h e  negat ive 
s i d e  of geophone 3 i s  capable o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  arrival o f  t h e  event  
s ignal .  Calcu la t ions  of new c i r c u i t  cons tan ts  f o r  an open i n  t h e  posi-  
t ive-going t r a n s i s t o r  make t h e  channel usable  f o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of d i s -  
cernable negat ive da ta .  
The experiment w a s  flown on Apollo 16 without  any changes t o  t h e  ac- 
t i v e  seismic d e t e c t i o n  system, and has performed without a recurrence o f  
t h e  Apollo 1 4  problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
An i n t e r m i t t e n t  failure (open) most l i k e l y  occurred i n  t h e  p o s i t i v e -  
going diode-wired t r a n s i s t o r  i n  t h e  loga r i thmic  compressor f o r  geophone 3,  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  i n t e r m i t t e n t  loss of d a t a  from t h e  geophone. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
No c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w a s  taken s i n c e  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  t r a n s i s t o r  
ind ica ted  t h a t  a generic  problem d i d  not  e x i s t .  
Bond 
joint - 
F C ol I ector 
Bond 
joint 
k- Emitter 
Figure 4.- Diode-wired 2N2484-2B transistor. 
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APOLLO 7 FA1 LURE OF LOWER EQUl PMENT BAY FLOODLI GHTS 
The loss  of the primary floodlights in the Apollo 7 command module lower equip- 
ment bay was an example of crew observation of an off-nominal condition as well as of 
a preflight procedure problem reflecting a lack of understanding of the life-limiting 
details of some components. The flight hardware was mounted in the returned command 
module and thus was  available for  examination and testing. The procedures employed 
in determining the cause and the necessary corrective action a r e  apparent in the reports  
that follow. Extracts from Problem and Discrepancy List  reports are not included 
because at the time of the Apollo 7 mission, this par t  of the reporting system had not 
yet been formalized and did not extend past the t ime of the mission report. 
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EXTRACT 
Apollo 7 Mission Report 
December, 1968 
11.21 FAILED FLOODLIGHTS 
Sometime during t h e  mission, both of t h e  primary lamps f a i l e d  i n  
t h e  lower equipment bay f l o o d l i g h t s .  P o s t f l i g h t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  revea led  
t h a t  t h e  lamp f i laments  (cathodes)  had completely vaporized, which caused 
a diode t o  s h o r t  i n  each lamp d r i v e r .  
A new lamp has a s t a r t -up  vol tage  of about 500 v o l t s .  
ages,  t h e  cathode d e t e r i o r a t e s  t hus  increas ing  t h e  s t a r t - u p  vo l t age ,  
which can go as high as 1800 v o l t s .  The diode is r a t e d  at 700 v o l t s ;  
t h e r e f o r e ,  it would burn out .  The r a t e  of cathode d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i s  de- 
pendent on t h e  ope ra t ing  vol tage.  
t h e  dimming r h e o s t a t  is halfway between t h e  f u l l - d i m  and f u l l - b r i g h t  posi-  
t i o n s .  
As t h e  lamp 
Maximum d e t e r i o r a t i o n  r a t e  occurs when 
Tes t s  are i n  progress t o  e s t a b l i s h  lamp l i f e  at  t h e  c r i t i c a l  opera- 
Normally, t hese  lamps should ope ra t e  2000 hours.  t i n g  vol tage.  
Procedural changes a r e  be ing  made t o  use only t h e  secondary lamp 
on full b r i g h t  during ground t e s t s ,  and cons idera t ion  i s  being given t o  
i n s t a l l i n g  f l i g h t  lamps j u s t  p r i o r  t o  the  countdown demonstration t e s t .  
No hardware changes are planned. This anomaly i s  s t i l l  open. 
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FAILURE OF LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY FLOODLIGHTS 
STATEMENT 
Both of t h e  primary lamps i n  t h e  lower equipment bay f l o o d l i g h t s  
f a i l e d  dur ing  t h e  mission. 
DISCUSSION 
Two f l o o d l i g h t s  mounted on t h e  X-X foo t  s t r u t s  provide i l lumina- 
t i o n  of t h e  work a reas  and panels i n  t h e  lower equipment bay. Each 
f lood l igh t  f i x t u r e  c o n s i s t s  of a primary and secondary f luo rescen t  lamp 
and a lamp d r i v e r  c i r c u i t  ( f i g .  1). 
The primary lamps i n  both f i x t u r e s  f a i l e d  during t h e  mission. Post- 
f l i g h t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  revea led  t h a t  t h e  f i lament  (cathode)  i n  each lamp 
had vapor ized ,  s h o r t i n g  a diode i n  t h e  a s soc ia t ed  lamp d r i v e r  c i r c u i t .  
A new lamp has a s t a r t i n g  vol tage of about 500 v o l t s ,  bu t  as t h e  lamp 
i s  used, t h e  cathode i s  expended. As t h e  lamp approaches i t s  l i f e  limit 
of 2000 hours ,  t h e  s t a r t i n g  vol tage  inc reases  and may reach values as 
high as 1800 v o l t s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  diode i n  t h e  lamp d r i v e r  c i r c u i t ,  
r a t ed  at 700 v o l t s  , could s h o r t .  
The r a t e  of cathode expenditure i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  ope ra t ing  vo l t age ,  
w i t h  t h e  expenditure r a t e  be ing  m a x i m u m  when t h e  dimming rheos t a t  is  
about halfway between t h e  dim and f u l l - b r i g h t  p o s i t i o n .  The, f l o o d l i g h t s  
on t h e  Apollo 7 spacecraf't  had a minimum of 400 hours of use p r i o r  t o  
launch, and t h e  opera t ing  i n t e n s i t y  w a s  not determined. The Apollo 8 
spacec ra f t  had approximately 100 hours of use p r i o r  t o  launch, and no 
f a i l u r e s  were experienced dur ing  t h a t  miss ion .  
Tes t s  were performed with a new lamp opera ted  a t  a c r i t i c a l  vo l t age  
l e v e l  f o r  m a x i m u m  cathode expendi ture .  
f a i l e d  after 80 hours ,  t h e  lamp could be tu rned  o f f ,  r e s t a r t e d ,  and dim- 
med u n t i l  t h e  t e s t  w a s  terminated a f t e r  648 hours .  
Although t h e  cathode h e a t e r s  
CO NCLUS I ON 
The primary lamps probably f a i l e d  because of excess ive  opera t ion  
t ime i n  t h e  dimmed pos i t i on  p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t .  
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APOLLO 10 AND 11 FUEL CELL CONDENSER EXIT-TEMPERATURE OSCl  LLATIONS 
Fuel cell condenser exit-temperature oscillations had been observed on several  
missions. When they recurred during the Apollo 10 mission, the need for  an in-depth 
investigation to better understand the mechanism and the significance of the oscillations 
was  apparent. In this example, the flight hardware could not be returned for  examina- 
tion because it was mounted in the service module. The service module separates from 
the command module at  the time of entry and is not recoverable. 
The anomaly resolution analysis procedures and the results are presented in the 
report that follows. Extracts from Problem and Discrepancy Lis ts  and mission reports 
are not included because the anomaly resolution applies to several  missions and because 
the investigation was subsequent to individual mission-oriented activities. 
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FUEL CELL CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE OSCILLATIONS 
STATEMENT OF ANOMALY 
During t h e  Apollo 10 f l i g h t ,  t h e  condenser e x i t  t empera ture  f o r  
f u e l  c e l l  2 experienced l imi t - cyc le  o s c i l l a t i o n s  of from 15' t o  20' F 
f u l l  amplitude while i n  lunar o r b i t .  Review of t h e  f l i g h t  d a t a  r evea led  
t h e  presence of a p e r i o d i c  d is turbance  throughout t h e  f l i g h t ,  and analy- 
s is  showed t h i s  d i s turbance  w a s  t h e  t r i g g e r  f o r  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s .  The 
d i s tu rbance  was t y p i f i e d  by a r ap id  1.5'  t o  2' F drop i n  condenser e x i t  
temperature with a slow recovery t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  va lue  and occurred every 
3 t o  8 minutes ( f i g .  1). The Anomaly Summary Sec t ion  of t h e  Apollo 10 
Mission Repart (MSC-00126) descr ibes  t h e  d is turbances  and o s c i l l a t i o n s  
i n  d e t a i l .  
Fuel c e l l  2 condenser e x i t  temperature w a s  a l s o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  d i s -  
tu rbed  during t h e  e n t i r e  Apollo 11 f l i g h t  ( f i g .  2 )  bu t  d i d  n o t  exper ience  
t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  observed i n  Apollo 1 0 .  A f u r t h e r  review of a v a i l a b l e  
d a t a  shows t h e  presence of a similar d is turbance  on e i t h e r  f u e l  c e l l  2 
or  3 (one a f f e c t e d  f u e l  c e l l  p e r  f l i g h t )  dur ing  Apollo 7 ,  8 ,  and 9 .  A s  
a r e s u l t ,  an in-depth i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w a s  conducted t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  cause 
of t h e  d is turbance  and i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  terms of f u t u r e  i n f l i g h t  f u e l  
c e l l  performance. Three e s s e n t i a l l y  independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  of these,  
d i s turbances  were performed by North American Rockwell, P r a t t  and Whitney , 
and t h e  NASA Manned Spacecraf t  Center. The f ind ings  of t h e s e  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  
were d iscussed  i n  d e t a i l  i n  meetings at t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center on 
September 11 and 1 2 ,  1969, and t h e  combined r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  ana lyses ,  
a r e  p re sen ted  h e r e i n .  
DISCUSSION 
An i n t e n s i v e  ana lys i s  of t h e  ava i l ab le  d a t a ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  from 
Apollo 10 and 11, r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  following observa t ions  as t o  t h e  d i s -  
tu rbance  and i t s  cause.  
a. Aoollo 11 d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h e  secondary bypass va lve  ( f i g .  3 )  d i d  
not move as a r e s u l t  of t h e  p e r i o d i c  d is turbance ;  t h i s  obse rva t ion  i s  
based on t h e  slow recovery t ime (on t h e  order  of 4 minutes)  f o r  condenser 
e x i t  temperature fo l lowing  each d is turbance .  I f  t h e  va lve  had moved, f u l l  
recovery should have taken  p l a c e  i n  a matter of seconds.  
r e t r o f i t  secondary coolan t  bypass valve (Block I va lve  poppet )  may have 
con t r ibu ted  t o  t h i s  behavior ;  however, t h e  va lve  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  do not  
support  t h i s  conclusion, s i n c e  t h e  response times of t h e  two va lves  
(Block I1 and Block I1 r e t r o f i t )  a r e  v i r t u a l l y  t h e  same f o r  a condenser 
e x i t  t enpe ra tu re  d is turbance  of t h e  type experienced i n  f l i g h t .  
The Block I1 
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b .  Apollo 1 0  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h e  secondary coolan t  bypass va lve  d i d  
respond t o  t h e  d i s tu rbance ,  based on t h e  r a p i d  condenser e x i t  temperature 
recovery r a t e  a f t e r  each d is turbance  , t h e  s l i g h t  condenser e x i t  tempera- 
t u r e  overshoot observed on most of t h e  Apollo 10 d is turbances  and t h e  f a c t  
t ha t  o s c i l l a t i o n s  were observed. 
c. Apollo 7 ,  8 ,  and 9 d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h e  presence of a d i s tu rbance  
throughout each f l i g h t  with pe r iod  and amplitude s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  d i s t u r b -  
ance observed on Apollo 10 and 11. 
d. Apollo 11 d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h e  condenser e x i t  t empera ture  d i s t u r b -  
ance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  was e i t h e r  a l t e r e d  o r  i t s  presence w a s  ques t ionab le  
during and immediately a f t e r  major burns of s i g n i f i c a n t  d u r a t i o n ,  i n d i -  
cat ing a s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  l o n g i t u d i n a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n .  
e .  The condenser e x i t  temperature d i s tu rbance  has only been observed 
under zero-g f l i g h t  cond i t ions .  
f .  Fuel c e l l  performance w a s  not a f f e c t e d  by t h e  condenser e x i t  t e m -  
pe ra tu re  d is turbance  n o r ,  i n  t h e  case of Apollo 1 0 ,  by t h e  r e s u l t a n t  o s c i l -  
l a t  oxy behavior.  
g. Only one f u e l  c e l l ,  e i t h e r  i n  p o s i t i o n  2.or 3,  has experienced 
t h e  d is turbance  on each f l i g h t .  
h. Apollo 10 and 11 d a t a  show a d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  
frequency of t h e  d is turbance  and t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  load  on t h e  a f f e c t e d  f u e l  
c e l l  ( f i g .  4 ) .  
Each of t h e  following items wa6 i n v e s t i g a t e d  p r i o r  t o  a d e t a i l e d  
analysis  of  t h e  p o s s i b l e  ce-uses of t h e  d i s tu rbance  and each produced neg- 
a t i v e  f ind ings .  
a. Var ia t ions  o r  s i m i l a r i t i e s  of secondary loop  ( w a t e r / g l y c o l )  
plumbing f o r  a l l  a f f e c t e d  f u e l  c e l l s  , i nc lud ing  l i n e  r o u t i n g s ,  loop  
volume , and component c a l i b r a t i o n s  
b. Var ia t ions  o r  s i m i l a r i t i e s  of a l l  component and powerplant 
acceptance and checkout t e s t  r e s u l t s  of a f f e c t e d  fuel  c e l l s  , i nc lud ing  
l i n e  rout ings , loop  volume, and component c a l i b r a t i o n s  
c. Var ia t ions  'or s i m i l a r i t i e s  of t h e  p h y s i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  ( s u r f a c e  
t ens ion  and v i s c o s i t y )  of Type I1 wate r /g lyco l  s o l u t i o n s  from d i f f e r e n t  
l o t s  
d. Var ia t ions  o r  s i m i l a r i t i e s  of f u e l  c e l l  and s p a c e c r a f t  i n t e r -  
face hardware conf igu ra t ion  regard ing  a f f e c t e d  fuel c e l l s .  
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Subsequent t o  Apollo 11, a l l  p o s s i b l e  causes of t h e  d is turbance  were 
l i s t e d  t o  s e r v e  as a b a s i s  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  a n a l y t i c a l  teams 
The d is turbance  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  were a l s o  l i s t e d ,  and each p o s s i b l e  cause 
w a s  examined f o r  conformance with t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Table I summar- 
i z e s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  causes and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  A d i s c u s s i o n  of each of 
t hese  p o s s i b l e  causes i s  presented i n  t h e  following paragraphs.  
Poss ib le  Causes Eliminated 
The fol lowing p o s s i b l e  causes o f  t h e  temperature o s c i l l a t i o n s  were 
determined y o  be i n v a l i d .  . 
Slug  of cold water /g lycol  from t h e  r ad ia to r . -  A s l u g  of co ld  water/ 
g lyco l  from t h e  r a d i a t o r  with a r a d i a t o r  o u t l e t  temperature  drop r a t e  
g r e a t e r  t han  50" F/minute could cause t h e  condenser e x i t  temperature  d i s -  
turbance.  A s  t h e  s l u g  en tered  t h e  condenser, a drop i n  t h e  condenser 
e x i t  teniperaturo on t h e  o rde r  of 2' F would r e s u l t .  However, t h e r e  i s  
no reason t3 ox:.ect a s l u g  of cold water /glycol  t o  occur p e r i o d i c a l l y  i n  
t h e  r a d i a t o r  -an? e x h i b i t  a per iod  whioh va r i e s  with load  as observed on 
ApollrJ 1 0 ,  nor would t h i s  cold s l u g  explain t h e  slow condenser e x i t  t e m -  
pe ra tu re  recovery cbserved on Apollo 11. Since no i n d i c a t i o n  of such a 
r a d i s t o r  resF3nse w a s  observed on any of t h e  a f f e c t e d  f u e l  c e l l  coolant  
l co>s ,  t h i s  p o s s i b l e  cause w a s  e l iminated.  
Elockage of secondary reKenerator cold s i d e  ( h o t  s i d e  of secondary 
coolant  bypass v a l v e ) . -  Blockage of t h e  cold s i d e  of t h e  secondary re- 
g e n e r a t o r ,  as n i g h t  res,ult  from bubble or s ludge entrapment,  could pro- 
duce t h e  d is turbance  i n  t h e  condenser ex i t  t e m p e r a t w e .  Such blockage 
uould r e s u l t  i n  an i n c o r r e c t  h o t / c o l d  mixture r a t i o  a t  t h e  secondary by- 
pass va lve ,  v i t h  t h e  co lde r  f l u i d  from t h e  r a d i a t o r  reaching t h e  conden- 
s e r  and causing a loss of coolant  regenerat ion c a p a b i l i t y .  This t ype  
cf blockage i s  u n l i k e l y ,  s i n c e ,  t o  exh ib i t  t h e  proper ra te  of decrease 
i n  t h e  condenser e x i t  temperature ,  it must occur suddenly wi th  flow 
blockage g r e a t e r  than 90 percen t .  I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  passages would have 
t o  be opened slowly t o  e x h i b i t  t h e  recovery c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  noted a f te r  
t h e  Apollo 11 d i s tu rbance .  Bubble entrapment would be e q e c t e d  t o  b u i l d  
~p slowly m3. z x h i b i t  a r ap id  recovery as t h e  bubble passed through t h e  
r egene ra t - r .  'The p e r i o d i c  v a r i a t i o n  could poss ib ly  r e s u l t  from t h e  sludge 
sr bubble z i r x l a t i n g  around t h e  loop. Only a minor bhange i n  t h e  d i s -  
turbance per iod would be expected with changing load  ( f u l l  regenera tor  
verslis f u l l  aypass  f l o w ) ,  on t h e  o rde r  of 1 minute d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
two f l ~ w  modes. The p e r i o d  v a r i a t i o n  with load  observed on Apollo 10 w a s  
R?Froximately 4 t o  8 minutes and cannot be explained by r e g e n e r a t o r  co ld  
s i d e  blockage. 
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St i ck ing  secondary coolant  bypass valve.-  A secondary bypass valve 
which w a s  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  movement could poss ib ly  cause a condenser e x i t  
temperature d is turbance ,  s i n c e  an i n c o r r e c t  mixture r a t i o  could cause a 
.cold s l u g  of water /g lycol  t o  reach t h e  condenser. There i s ,  however, no 
apparent reason f o r  t h e  r e g u l a r i t y  un le s s  s ludge i s  c i r c u l a t i n g  i n  t h e  
loop. A s t i c k i n g  va lve  would a l s o  r e q u i r e  a corresponding change i n  
e l e c t r i c a l  l oad  o r  r a d i a t o r  o u t l e t  temperature  i n  o rde r  f o r  t h e  bypass 
valve t o  be i n c o r r e c t l y  pos i t ioned  near  t h e  ze ro  regenera t ion  p o i n t .  This 
poss ib l e  cause r equ i r e s  t h a t  t h e  valve be i n c o r r e c t l y  pos i t ioned  and re- 
s t r i c t e d  i n  t r a v e l  a t  t h e  t i m e  of each d i s tu rbance .  Since t h e r e  i s  no 
reason f o r  t h e  valve t o  ever reach t h e  necessary p o s i t i o n  under t h e  ob- 
served opera t ing  cond i t ions ,  t h i s  p o s s i b l e  cause was r e j e c t e d .  
Temporary blockage of coolant  ( w a t e r / g l y c o l )  s i d e  of condenser .- 
Temporary condenser blockage (20  t o  25 p e r c e n t )  on t h e  coolant  s i d e ,  as 
w i t h  a bubble o r  s ludge entrapment,  could produce t h e  d i s t u r b a n c e .  Again, 
the p e r i o d i c i t y  of t h e  occurrence could be explained by t h e  bubble or 
sludge c i r c u l a t i n g  through t h e  loop ,  i f  t h e  apparent  l oad  dependency as 
noted on Apollo 1 0  and 11 i s  discounted.  However, t h e  condenser e x i t  
temFerature should i n c r e a s e  s l i g h t l y  as t h e  e f f e c t i v e  condensing a r e a  i s  
reduced and then  drop as t h e  core becomes unblocked when t h e  contaminant 
moves through. An i n c r e a s e  i n  condenser e x i t  temperature  p r i o r  t o  t h e  
dis turbance has not been c o n s i s t e n t l y  observed, with only a few such in -  
s tances  on Apollo 10 which are considered t o  be wi th in  t h e  no i se  l e v e l  of 
the d a t a .  Add i t iona l ly ,  t e s t  and performance experience has shown t h e  
secondary bypass va lve  t o  be sooner a f f e c t e d  by contamination t h a n  o t h e r  
coolant loop components. 
Hydrogen pump shutdown and res tar t  .- I n t e r m i t t e n t  s t o p - s t a r t  oper- 
a t ion  of t h e  hydrogen pump can e x h i b i t  t h e  proper  temperature  d is turbance  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  Tes t ing  has demonstrated extremely r a p i d  drops i n  con- 
denser e x i t  temperature  f o r  both pump shutdown and s t a r t u p .  However, t h e  
r e g u l a r i t y  of t h e  observed d i s tu rbance  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  a randomly 
i n t e r n i t t e n t  hydrogen pump which most probably would f a i l  completely e a r l y  
i n  t h e  f l i g h t .  Also, t h e r e  is no reason why t h e  pump would ope ra t e  i n  
t h i s  mode i n  zero-g ope ra t ion  only.  
Coolant flow v a r i a t i o n s . -  A slow decrease i n  coo lan t  flow followed 
by an abrupt i n c r e a s e ,  such as might r e s u l t  from f i l t e r  plugging and un- 
plugging, could produce t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  d i s turbance .  P e r i o d i c i t y  
might be explained by contaminant c i r c u l a t i o n .  A coo lan t  flow i n c r e a s e  
of 20 t o  30 pounds p e r  hour would cause a 2' t o  3' F condenser e x i t  t e m -  
pe ra tu re  change. However, t h i s  change would be observable  i n  r a d i a t o r  
d e l t a  temperature  ( i n l e t / o u t l e t  ) , a condi t ion  which was no t  observed. 
Variations of t h e  p e r i o d  with load  are a l s o  no t  expla ined  f o r  t h i s  pos- 
s i b l e  cause.  
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Water discharge blockage.-  Loss of water discharge c a p a b i l i t y ,  as 
could be caused by high water  back p res su re  or an i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  s t i c k -  
i ng  discharge va lve ,  was considered as a possible  cause of t h e  d i s t u r b -  
ance. This cause,  however, would not  be expected t o  demonstrate t h e  ob- 
served d i s tu rbance  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The primary regenera tor  ho t -s ide  
temperature and condenser i n l e t  temperature would be reduced as t h e  water 
f l a shed  t o  steam i n  t h e  r egene ra to r .  More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  r a p i d  tempera- 
t u r e  changes i n  t h e  hydrogen loop would b e  damped before  t h e  e f f e c t s  
could be observed i n  condenser e x i t  temperature changes,  l a r g e l y  because 
of t h e  overwhelming thermal  capaci tance of t h e  primary coo lan t  f l u i d  sys-  
t e m .  A high water back p r e s s u r e  would be manifested i n  a l l  t h r e e  f u e l  
c e l l s  because of t h e  common water discharge manifolding. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
a ''pH H i "  i n d i c a t i o n  would be expected,  as was observed during a thermal  
vacuum t e s t  when t h e  water  discharge l i n e  f roze  and blocked.  No "pH H i "  
i n d i c a t i o n s  were observed during any f l i g h t  when t h e  condenser e x i t  t e m -  
p e r a t u r e  d i s tu rbance  was p r e s e n t .  
E r r a t i c  primary bypass valve.-  E r r a t i c  c o n t r o l  by t h e  primary bypass 
valve could a f f e c t  condenser e x i t  temperature ,  s i n c e  a sudden opening 
would tend  t o  inc rease  condenser e x i t  temperature and a sudden c l o s u r e  
would lower t h e  e x i t  temperature .  However, r e c e n t  t e s t s  have shown t h a t  
hydrogen loop temperature p e r t u r b a t i o n s  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  c e l l  s t a c k  
are w e l l  damped p r i o r  t o  reaching t h e  condenser. Also, an e r r a t i c  p r i -  
mary valve would no t  be expected t o  produce a p e r i o d i c  d i s t u r b a n c e ,  nor 
i s  t h e r e  any reason why such behavior would not a l s o  b e  observed during 
ground ope ra t ion .  
R e s t r i c t e d  secondary coolant  bypass valve flow .- Temporary blockage 
o r  r e s t r i c t i o n  of flow through t h e  secondary bypass va lve  followed by 
sudden r e l e a s e  could produce t h e  observed d is turbance  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  
Such blockage could be caused by c i r c u l a t i n g  contaminat ion,  probably i n  
a ge la t inous  form. Experience has shown t h a t  contamination i n  t h e  coo lan t  
loop i s  more l i k e l y  t o  c o l l e c t  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of t h i s  va lve  (as during 
Apollo 7 and 9 )  t han  anywhere e l s e  i n  the  loop.  I n  t h e o r y ,  t h i s  mass of 
contamination would p e r i o d i c a l l y  accumulate i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of t h e  v a l v e ,  
g e n e r a l l y  i n  t h e  bypass flow passage of the valve and, when r e l e a s e d ,  
would cause a sha rp  decrease i n  condenser e x i t  temperature  because o f  t h e  
suddenly increased bypass f l u i d  flow. 
This  phenomenon i s  considered t o  be a r a t h e r  remote p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  
( a )  i f  t h e  bypass flow were slowly being r e s t r i c t e d ,  as it two reasons :  
would probably be f o r  contamination i n  t h e  l oop ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  con- 
denser  e x i t  temperature  above t h e  normal opera t ing  va lue  should be ob- 
se rved ,  b u t  t h i s  w a s  no t  t h e  case unless  it i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  low con- 
denser  e x i t  temperature  ( a t  t h e  lower end of t h e  d i s t u r b a n c e )  w a s  t h e  
s t eady  ope ra t ing  v a l u e  corresponding t o  t h e  valve p o s i t i o n ,  and ( b )  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h e  d is turbance  per iod  t o  load cannot b e  exp la ined .  A l so ,  
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t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  of t h e  d i s tu rbance  among t h e  f i v e  a f f e c t e d  f u e l  c e l l s  t ends  
t o  negate t h e  contamination theo ry ,  s i n c e  c i r c u l a t i n g  contamination would 
not be expected t o  produce nea r ly  i d e n t i c a l  r e s u l t s  on each a f f e c t e d  
powerplant. On Apollo 7 and 9 ,  slow condenser e x i t  temperature  excursions 
t o  abnormal values  ( n o t  p e r i o d i c  d i s t u r b a n c e s )  were a t t r i b u t e d  t o  re- 
s t r i c t e d  secondary coolant  bypass valve t r a v e l  r e s u l t i n g  from loop con- 
taminat ion.  However, none of t h e  f u e l  c e l l s  with r e s t r i c t e d  bypass valves  
displayed any evidence of a p e r i o d i c a l l y  d i s t u r b e d  condenser e x i t  tem- 
pe ra tu re .  Addi t iona l ly ,  t h e  Block I1 r e t r o f i t  valve on Apollo 11 w a s  
known t o  be less s e n s i t i v e  t o  contamination than  t h e  s tandard  Block I1 
valves bu t  w a s  a f f e c t e d  i n  t h e  same manner as t h e  Block I1 v a l v e s ;  t h i s  
f a c t  implies  t h a t  some phenomenon o t h e r  than contamination i s  t h e  cause 
of t h e  d i s tu rbance .  
Most Probable Cause 
One p o s s i b l e  cause remained t h a t  could not  be elimi-nated from t h e  
l i s t ;  t h a t  i s ,  condenser water r e t e n t i o n  and p e r i o d i c  release ( a  water 
s lug  from t h e  condenser) .  T h e  water s l u g  meets more of t h e  c r i t e r i a  
t h a t  descr ibe t h e  condenser e x i t  temperature  d is turbance  t h a n  does any 
o the r  poss ib l e  cause.  
Condenser water r e t e n t i o n  on t h e  hydrogen s i d e . -  Blockage of t h e  
condenser core  on t h e  hydrogen s i d e  could produce t h e  proper  d is turbance  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Condensed water  would have t o  c o l l e c t  and be contained 
e i t h e r  i n  o r  near  t h e  condenser e x i t  by s u r f a c e  t e n s i o n  f o r c e s .  This 
water would then  be r e l e a s e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y  i n  f a i r l y  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  as 
t h e  accumulated water became s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overcome r e t a i n i n g  f o r c e s .  I f  
the water were r e t a i n e d  a t  t h e  co re ,  t h e  temperatures  would e s s e n t i a l l y  
equal t h e  water /g lycol  i n l e t  temperature .  The subcooled water reaching 
the temperature probe would cause t h e  temperature  drop i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  
dz t a ,  and, i f  t h e  water were r e t a i n e d  on t h i s  probe because of s u r f a c e  
tension u n t i l  g radua l ly  blown o f f  o r  evaporated,  t h e  slow recove,y char- 
a q t e r i s t i c  observed i n  f l i g h t  could be explained.  Since t h e  condenser 
e x i t  temperature sensor  i s  downstream of t h e  bypass valve Vernatherm 
sensc r ,  t h e  r e l eased  s l u g  of water might a l s o  impinge on t h e  va lve  sensor  
a n d ,  i f  l a r g e  enough and cold enough, would caust  valve motion. P e r i o d i c  
recurrence would r e s u l t  from t h e  accumulation of water i n  t h e  condenser 
as a r e s u l t  of s u f a c e  t ens ion  u p t i 1  some c r i t i c a l  l e v e l  w a s  reached and 
the water was aeain re l eased .  Cependence of t h e  d is turbance  per iod  on 
e l e c t r i c a l  loads would r e s u l t  from water product ion i n c r e a s i n g  with in-  
creasing load.  The r a t e  of change of water condecsation i s  known t o  b e a r  
a near-instantaneous response r e l a t i o n s h i p  with s t e p  load  changes. 
Examination of sequence photography of t h e  hydrogen e x i t  plenum, wi th  
the  condenser opera t ing  i n  a h o r i z o n t a l  p o s i t i o n  during ground t e s t s ,  has 
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shown t h a t  s u r f a c e  t e n s i o n  plays a l a r g e  par t  i n  removal of w a t e r  conden- 
sa te ,  even i n  one-g ope ra t ion ,  and t h a t  t he  water does no t  l eave  t h e  con- . 
denser co re  i n  a uniform fa sh ion .  Normal one-g condenser ope ra t ion  i s  i n  
a v e r t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  launch pad. I n  t h e s e  films, r e l a t i v e -  
l y  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of water were r e t a i n e d  i n  some of t h e  hydrogen pas- 
sages and on t h e  coolant  passage walls a t  t h e  end of t h e  condenser core  
by s u r f a c e  t ens ion  and f r equen t ly  jo ined  toge the r  b e f o r e  being r e l e a s e d  
as l a r g e  globules  i n t o  t h e  e x i t  plenum ( f i g .  5 ) .  A d e f i n i t e  v a r i a t i o n  
w a s  observable i n  wet t ing  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  across  t h e  end of t h e  condenser.  
These r e s u l t s ,  along with t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a s l u g  of water out  t h e  condenser 
can produce a l l  of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  d is turbance  i n  ze ro  g ,  make 
t h i s  p o s s i b l e  cause t h e  most l i k e l y  candidate of t h o s e  considered.  
The quest ion of why t h e  d i s tu rbance  h a s  no t  been p r e s e n t  on every 
f u e l  c e l l  i f  a water s l u g  i s  t h e  cause remains t o  be answered. Analyses 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  condenser passageways (hydrogen s i d e ) ,  s u r f a c e  
wet t ing  p r o p e r t i e s ,  and/or hydrogen loop flow rates between i n d i v i d u a l  
powerplants allow t h i s  phenomenon t o  t a k e  p l a c e  only on those  p a r t i c u l a r  
powerplants where combinations of t h e s e  va r i ab le s  are e x a c t l y  r i g h t .  I n  
f a c t ,  f i g u r e  4 i l l u s t r a t e s  a d i f f e r e n c e  i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  between two 
affected.powerplants .  From t h e  v i s u a l  data  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  condenser 
t e s t  f i l m s ,  it i s  reasonable  t o  assume t h a t  water does no t  depa r t  t h e  
condenser i n  uniformly s i z e d  d rop le t s  on any powerplant bu t  r a t h e r ,  i n  
ze ro  g,  comes o f f  t h e  condenser i n  globules of varying s i zes  a t  i n t e r v a l s  
which depend on such f a c t o r s  as s u r f a c e  t ens ion  ( w e t t a b i l i t y ) ,  loop flow 
rate ,  condenser passage area ( c r o s s - s e c t i o n ) ,  b raze  uni formi ty ,  e t c .  I f  
it i s  f u r t h e r  assumed t h a t  a c r i t i c a l  combination of t h e s e  cond i t ions  i s  
requi red  t o  produce a water  s l u g  of a magnitude s u f f i c i e n t  t o  manifest  
an observable condenser ' e x i t  temperature d is turbance ,  t h e n  it i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  only a c e r t a i n  number of f u e l  c e l l s  w i l l  e x h i b i t  t h e  d i s tu rbance .  
Of t h e  15 Block I1 f u e l  c e l l s  flown t o  da t e ,  f i v e  have d isp layed  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I f  a water s l u g  is  t h e  cause of t h e  d is turbance ,  t h e r e  
i s  no reason t o  expect a change i n  t h e  r a t i o  of a f f e c t e d  f u e l  ce l l s ,  
s i n c e  no process changes were made. 
The appendix t o  t h i s  document presents  t h e  r e s u l t s  of an a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  probable condensed water behavior and i t s  e f f e c t  on condenser e x i t  
temperature .  
CONCLUSIONS 
From a l l  i n d i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  Apollo 11 f u e l  c e l l  2 secondary bypass 
valve ( a  Block I1 r e t r o f i t )  d i d  not move as a r e s u l t  of t h e  p e r i o d i c  
condenser e x i t  temperature  d i s t u r b a c e .  
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I f  t h e  cause of t h e  dis turbance i s  a water  s l u g  from t h e  condenser,  
the incidence rate of t h e  condenser e x i t  temperature  d is turbance  should 
not change s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  
Nei ther  t h e  temperature  d i s tu rbance  nor t h e  temperature  o s c i l l a t i o n s  
have shown any degradat ion i n  f u e l  c e l l  performance. No hardware changes 
w i l l  be made; however, procedures have been developed t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  damp 
these o s c i l l a t i o n s ,  should they occur .  
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TABLE I.- POSSIBLE CAUSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTURBANCE 
Character i s t i c s of d i  s t urb ance 
1. Per iod ic  
2.  Occurred only under zero-g conditions a l t e r e d  or e l imina ted  by major 
propuls ive  maneuvers 
3. Condenser e x i t  temperature t y p i c a l l y  dropped 1.5' t o  3.0' F i n  2 t o  
10 seconds 
4. Period of d i s turbance  r e l a t e d  t o  fue l  c e l l  load 
5 .  Rapid condenser e x i t  temperature recovery f o r  Block I1 bypass va lve  
(<20 seconds ) 
6 Slow condenser e x i t  temperature recovery f o r  Block I1 r e t r o f i t  by- 
pass valve ( - 4  minutes ) 
Poss ib le  c a u E  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8. 
9 .  
10. 
Cold wa te r /g iyco l  s l u g  from r a d i a t o r  
Secondary regenera tor  co ld  s i d e  blockage 
Secondary coolant  bypass valve motion r e s t r i c t i o n  ( s t i c k i n g )  
Condenser coolant  blockage 
I n t e r m i t t e n t  hydrogen pump opera t ion  
I n t e r m i t t e n t  coolant  pump opera t ion  
Water d ischarge  blockage 
E r r a t i c  primary bypass valve 
Slugging of condenser water  
R e s t r i c t e d  secondary coolant  bypass va lve  flow 
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Figure 1.- Apollo 10 condenser e x i t  temperature  d is turbance .  
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Figure 4.- Load-period r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
61 
. 
Figure 5.- Sequence photographs of hydrogen 
exit plenum. 
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(e) 
Figure 5. - Concluded. 
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APPEND1 X 
Water Condensate Behavior Analysis 
Seve ra l  t h e o r i e s  have been i n v e s t i g a t e d  t o  exp la in  t h e  abnormal 
va r i a t io r .  of primary s i d e  condenser e x i t  temperature .  "he most promis- 
i ng  of t hese  i s  a water bui ldup  at t h e  condenser with r e s u l t a n t  s l u g  
flow of subcooled condensate downstream t o  t h e  temperature  sensor  and 
t h e  Vernatherm sens ing  'element of t h e  secondary bypass va lve .  
By c a l c u l a t i n g  an e f f e c t i v e  r ad ius  of t h e  core  passages i n  t h e  
condenser and assuming p e r f e c t  we t t ing ,  a balance of s u r f a c e  t e n s i o n  
and p res su re  fo rces  shows t h a t  a pressure  d i f f e r e n t i a l  of approximately 
0 .02  p s i  (1 .96 cm H20) i s  requi red  t o  c l e a r  one condenser core  passage 
a f t e r  it has been f i l l e d  wi th  water. A t e s t  performed t o  measure t h e  
gas pressures  needed t o  blow t h e  water out showed t h e  average requi red  
pressure d i f f e r e n t i a l  t o  be 1.65 cm H 2 O .  
45 tubes , m d  t h e  extremes ranged from 1 . 5 5  t o  1 . 7 5  cm H20. "he f r i c -  
t i o n a l  p re s su re  drop,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, w a s  c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  normal con- 
d i t i o n s  ( c l e a n  passage )  t o  be approximately 0.002 p s i ,  or an o r d e r  of 
magnitude less than  t h e  pressure  drop requi red  t o  overcome c a p i l l a r y  
fo rces .  This would l e a d  t o  t h e  hypothesis  t h a t  t h e  s m a l l  t r a p e z o i d a l  
passages wi th in  t h e  condenser core  f i l l  up randomly (due t o  t h e  random 
nature  of condensation s i t e s )  u n t i l  s u f f i c i e n t  pressure  head i s  b u i l t  
up t o  overcome t h e  c a p i l l a r y  f o r c e s ,  at which t i m e  t h e  s l u g  i s  blown 
f r e e .  Sequence photography proves t h a t  t h i s  does indeed occur .  
This t e s t  w a s  rppeated on 
A cross-sect ion of condenser core  geometry i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  A-1 .  
The coolant  and condensate s e c t i o n s  a l t e r n a t e ,  l eav ing  a s o l i d  end-s t r ip  
of metal  between each condensate layer.  In  a one-g t e s t  , sequence photog- 
raphy shows t h a t  as t h e  condensate accumulates at t h e  tube ends,  some 
tubes become t o t a l l y  f i l l e d  with water. When enough tubes become f i l l e d ,  
dynamic p res su re  forces push t h e  expanding water globules  out  of t h e  
condenser and i n t o  t h e  e x i t  plenum a r e a .  
forces w i t n i n  t h e  tube  are overcome, t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c a p i l l a r y  a c t i o n  of 
the end s t r i p s  tends t o  accumulate condensate on t h e s e  s t r i p s .  
cilmulated condensate could not  run o f f  e a s i l y  i n  t h e  one-g t e s t ,  due t o  
the b a r r i e r  c r ea t ed  by braz ing  t h e  end p l a t e s  t o  t h e  co re .  Hence, even 
i n  one y ,  a i i  end s t r i p s  can become completely covered with water  during 
normal operat ion with t h e  condenser i n  a h o r i z o n t a l  p o s i t i o n .  
t h l s  effr-ct  would be even more pronounced, allowing much t h i c k e r  l a y e r s  
01' water t o  'be b u i l t  up on t h e  end of t h e  condenser. 
these l aye r s  would b u i l d  up u n t i l  t h e  combination of random p r e s s u r e  
f ld - tua t ion?  i n  t h e  gas stream and viscous shea r  stresses a t  t h e  water- 
gac l n t e r f a c e  become s u f f i c i e n t  t o  f o r c e  globules  of condensate from t h e  
cori5t-nser. R t e s t  showed t h a t  very l a r g e  globules  can accumulate,  even 
Even a f t e r  t h e  s u r f a c e  t e n s i o n  
This ac- 
I n  zero g ,  
The t h i c k n e s s  of 
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i n  a one-g environment. An attempt w a s  made t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  s i z e  of 
t h e s e  globules  and t o  c o r r e l a t e  t h e i r  t r anspor t  frequency w i t h  f u e l  c e l l  
load.  This a t tempt  was f u t i l e  because t h e  p re s su re  f l u c t u a t i o n s  are 
completely random, and t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  core geometry due t o  braz ing  and 
f i n  shape d i s t o r t i o n  are impossible t o  c a l c u l a t e .  
Large condensate globules  l eav ing  t h e  condenser c o l l e c t  on t h e  s o l i d  
end s t r i p s  a t  t h e  g l y c o l  i n l e t  t o  t h e  condenser and could be subcooled 
as much as 20' F below t h e  normal 160' F s a t u r a t i o n  temperature  i f  allowed 
t o  remain long enough. I n  ze ro  g ,  when a subcooled g lobule  l eaves  t h e  
condenser,  most of it w i l l  be  c l i n g i n g  t o  the w a l l s  of  t h e  t r a n s f e r  tube 
(upper  view of f i g .  A-2), s i n c e  it w i l l  tend t o  c o l l e c t  i n  t h e  e x i t  mani- 
f o l d  as shown i n  t h e  lower view. I t  w i l l  then proceed downstream u n t i l  
it comes t o  t h e  enlarged area f o r  t h e  Vernatherm, o r  valve sensing e le-  
ment ( f i g .  A - 3 ) .  I f  t h e  condensate l a y e r  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t h i c k ,  contact  
w i l l  be made between t h e  Vernatherm f i n s  and t h e  condensate ,  and t h e  w e t -  
t i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  f in- tube geometry w i l l  cause t h e  condensate t o  
cover ,  or at tempt  t o  cover ,  t h e  e n t i r e  exposed s u r f a c e  area of t h e  Verna- 
therm element.  I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  condensate l a y e r  i s  not  s u f f i -  
c i e n t l y  t h i c k  t o  cause adhesion t o  t h e  Vernatherm element,  it w i l l  be 
fo rced  downstream by t h e  viscous shea r ing  stresses a t  t h e  l iquid-gas i n t e r -  
f ace  until it reaches t h e  temperature  sensor .  Average c l ea rance  between 
t h e  end of t h e  temperature sensor  probe and t h e  tube w a l l  i s  0.19 (20 .02)  
inch.  This c learance can vary considerably,  however, with p o s i t i o n i n g  of 
t h e  probe angle  a t  assembly. Vernatherm element-to-wall c learance i s  
t y p i c a l l y  0 . 1  inch.  A s  a t  t h e  Vernatherm, i f  t h e  condensate l a y e r  is  suf-  
f i c i e n t l y  t h i n ,  it w i l l  not  touch t h e  sensor .  I f ,  however, t h e  l a y e r  ex- 
ceeds a c e r t a i n  c r i t i c a l  t h i c k n e s s ,  t h e  c a p i l l a r y  a c t i o n  of t h e  condensate 
on t h e  senso r  w i l l  cause t h e  water t o  almost immediately engulf t h e  senso r  
probe ( f i g .  A-3 ,  lower v i e w ) ,  which i s  very much smaller than t h e  Verna- 
therm element.  I t  should be emphasized t h a t  each f u e l  c e l l  w i l l  have a 
d i f f e r e n t  c r i t i c a l  t h i ckness  between t h e  t i p  of t h e  sensor  and t h e  tube 
w a l l ,  depending on t h e  t o l e r a n c e s  at t h e  mounting assembly of t h e  senso r .  
The fol lowing i s  a proposed mechanism t o  exp la in  t h e  anomalous con- 
denser  e x i t  temperature  behavior .  
S m a l l  c r i t i c a l  t h i ckness  at t h e  temperature-sensing element,  subcooled 
condensate bui ldup  occurs u n t i l  a globule of water moves downstream of 
t h e  condenser.  Assume t h a t  t h e  thickness  of t h e  condensate l a y e r  i s  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cause adhesion at t h e  Vernatherm element,  due t o  t h e  en- 
l a r g e d  flow area f o r  t h e  Vernatherm, but i s  t h i c k  enough t o  engulf t h e  
temperature  sensor .  
t h e  sensor  temperature  w i l l  immediately begin dropping a t  t h e  r a t e  of 
about 5' F/sec ,  which is g r e a t e r  t han  the  ra te  seen i n  f l i g h t .  
on t h e  s i z e  of t h e  l i q u i d  g lobu le ,  t h e  temperature  w i l l  drop u n t i l  t h e  
dynamic pressure  fo rces  of t h e  gas stream blow it o f f  t h e  senso r ,  o r  
u n t i l  t h e  h e a t  t r a n s f e r  between t h e  gas stream and t h e  water-coated sen- 
so r  allows t h e  senso r  probe t o  begin i ts  recovery.  After  t h e  condensate 
I n  zero g ,  f o r  a f u e l  c e l l  with a very 
For  t h e  extreme case of 20' F subcooled condensate,  
Depending 
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is blown o f f ,  t h e  temperature  recovery i s  much slower than  t h e  drop,  due 
t o  t h e  much smaller hea t  t r a n s f e r  c o e f f i c i e n t  between t h e  gas and t h e  
sensor .  The de tec t ed  v a r i a t i o n  i n  condenser e x i t  temperature  w i l l  be 
similar t o  t h a t  shown i n  f i g u r e  A-4 (upper  v iew) .  The temperature  drop 
and subsequent recovery i s  on t h e  order  of  seconds;  whereas t h e  t i m e  
between d is turbances  v a r i e s  i nve r se ly  with t h e  cu r ren t  and i s  on t h e  
order  of s e v e r a l  minutes. 
For t h i s  case t h e  temperature  sensor  w i l l  produce te lemet ry  d a t a  
showing ternperature v a r i a t i o n s ,  bu t  i n  r e a l i t y  t h e  va lve  poppet posi-  
t i o n ,  arii hence the  bypass r a t i o ,  never changes. 
I n  the  case of a s e r v i c e  propuls ion  f i r i n g ,  a momentary g r a v i t y  
f i e l d  i s  c rea t ed  i n  a d i r e c t i o n  co inc ident  with t h e  downward flow of 
condensate through the.  condenser. Th i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  c leans  t h e  tube  
wal ls  by f1,Jshing t h e  condenser e n t i r e l y  of  condensate .  The r e s u l t i n g  
very l a rge  subcooled condensate g lobule  a f f e c t s  not only t h e  temperature  
sensor but  a l s o  t h e  Vernatherm element and causes t h e  valve t o  r e a c t  ac- 
cordingly.  ‘?he r e s u l t i n g  v a r i a t i o n  i n  condenser e x i t  temperature  i s  
shown i n  f ipu re  A-4 ( lower view).  
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Figure A-1.  - Condenser core  geometry. 
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Figure A-2.-  Primary s i d e  condenser e x i t  geometry. 
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(a) D is turbance  of the f i rs t  t y p e .  
T i m e  
(b) Dis turbance  of the second t y p e .  
Figure A-4.- Var ia t ions  i n  condenser e x i t  temperature  r e s u l t -  
i n g  from condensate s lug  flow. 
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